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“If we have erred in the details, we do submit at least that the philosophy is right.” 
- Herbert Wechsler on the Model Penal Code 
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Herbert Wechsler was hailed as a “giant of the law” when he passed away in 
2000.1 His achievements spanned legal academia, legal practice, and legal reform. And, at 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (dwolitz@utk.edu). I would like to thank 
Spenser Powell for exemplary research assistance and Dwight Aarons, Charles Barzun, Michael Cottone, Jeremy 
Pam, Dan Priel, Briana Rosenbaum, Sara Seo, Anders Walker, and James Whitman for their thoughtful com-
ments and encouragement on this project. I am again indebted to Jeffrey Shulman for his indefatigable intellectual 
support and camaraderie. 
 Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 
321, 394 (1956). 
 1. Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2000, at C21. 
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the height of his career, he sat at the apex of three doctrinal fields: criminal law, Constitu-
tional law, and federal courts.2 In legal historiography, Wechsler is conventionally—and 
correctly, I believe—grouped together with Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller, as 
an architect of the Legal Process School of jurisprudence, an approach which came to 
dominate the elite legal academy in the 1950s and 1960s.3 Wechsler’s work in Constitu-
tional law and federal courts has long been understood as emblematic, even generative, of 
the Legal Process approach more generally. But the connection between his work in crim-
inal law and Legal Process jurisprudence has received significantly less attention.4 This is 
understandable because, as its name implies, the Legal Process approach emphasized is-
sues of procedural regularity and institutional competence over substantive doctrine. Yet 
Wechsler’s proudest achievement was the decade-long systematic reformation of substan-
tive criminal law doctrine which culminated in the publication of the Model Penal Code. 
The Model Penal Code project lasted from 1952 until 1962 and, on Wechsler’s 
account, took up the bulk of his scholarly energy during that period5—a period during 
which he also published three classics of the Legal Process approach unrelated to criminal 
law: The Federal Courts and the Federal System,6 The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,7 
and Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.8 On the one hand, it seems unlikely 
that Wechsler’s criminal law work was unaffected by his more general jurisprudential 
                                                          
 2. Henry Paul Monaghan, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1370 (2000). 
 3. It may be useful to distinguish between a first generation of Legal Process scholars and a second genera-
tion, although such listings are necessarily a matter of debatable judgment, and this one does not pretend to be 
authoritative. Nevertheless, any list of the first generation of Legal Process scholars would have to include—in 
addition to Herbert Wechsler, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller—Paul Freund, Louis Jaffe, Edward Levi, 
and (perhaps more controversially) Karl Llewellyn. See Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome 
Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 128-29 n.26 (1974). In addition to this Harvard-heavy list, one should add a group 
of scholars at the University of Wisconsin: James Willard Hurst, Lloyd K. Garrison, Carl Auerbach, and Samuel 
Mermin. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Willard Hurst, Master of the Legal Process, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 
1187-88 (1997). The second generation of Legal Process scholars was much larger, and with no pretense of 
comprehensiveness, I would count among them Alexander Bickel, George Packer, Harry Wellington, Paul Bator, 
Paul Mishkin, John Hart Ely, Henry Paul Monaghan, Philip Kurland and (perhaps more controversially) Ronald 
Dworkin and Robert Bork. The influence of the Legal Process approach has, of course, continued beyond that 
second generation and is still robust today in the professoriate and in the judiciary. Current Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Kennedy (as well as the late Justice Scalia) all took the Legal Process course at Harvard Law 
School. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (1994). 
 4. One exception to this general lack of attention is Markus Dubber’s treatment of the Legal Process prov-
enance of the Code. See Markus D. Dubber, The Model Penal Code, Legal Process, and the Alegitimacy of 
American Penalty, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 239, 239-61 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 
2014) [hereinafter Alegitimacy]; MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 7-11 (2002); 
Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 
53, 63-64 (2000). See also Michael Willrich, Criminal Justice in the United States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA, VOL. 3, 195, 213 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (noting that the 
Model Penal Code “bore the unmistakable imprint” of the Legal Process approach).   
 5. Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from 
the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 918 (1993) [hereinafter Oral History] (“From 
1952 until the Code was completed—that is to say, for ten years—the development of the Model Penal Code 
absorbed every bit of time and energy that I had.”). 
 6. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953) 
 7. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
 8. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) [here-
inafter Neutral Principles]. 
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views.9 On the other hand, it is not immediately obvious what a Legal Process approach 
to substantive criminal law would entail. What connects Wechsler, the great Legal Process 
thinker, with Wechsler, the great criminal law reformer? There is a further puzzle to 
Wechsler’s work on criminal law. Despite his unparalleled importance in twentieth cen-
tury criminal law reform and criminal law scholarship, Wechsler’s name is not identified 
today with any particular theory of criminal law. What was the Wechslerian theory of 
criminal law? 
The answers to these puzzles are, I believe, connected. Wechsler’s work on crim-
inal law was, in fact, thoroughly saturated in Legal Process jurisprudence, just as his work 
on Constitutional law and federal courts was. But the Legal Process approach itself es-
chewed the kind of single-value, idealistic normative theorizing that we often expect from 
criminal law theorists.10 The Legal Process approach, contrary to much legal thinking that 
came before and after it, was not focused on building up idealistic abstractions and de-
manding that the positive law conform to those ideals. Moreover, Wechsler did not see the 
task of legal reform as an exercise in remaking the law from a blank slate according to any 
single overarching normative theory of criminal law. Rather, Wechsler and his fellow Le-
gal Process thinkers believed that reformers should start with a thorough examination of 
the existing and often competing values embedded in the law and try to craft reasonable 
and workable doctrines that reflect, preserve, and when possible, reconcile all of the legit-
imate values at stake.11 The project of rationalization that Wechsler undertook in the 
Model Penal Code was thus not a philosophical project of justification or a total recon-
struction from first principles of the entire field of criminal law. 
Nor did Wechsler believe that rigorous application of reason could solve all con-
troversies in the criminal law. Wechsler, like Henry Hart, understood the field of criminal 
law to contain multiple and often competing values, and he did not pretend that reason 
alone could determine the outcome of difficult value choices.12 The rationalization project 
Wechsler understood himself to be undertaking involved making criminal law doctrine as 
internally coherent as possible and crafting the doctrines of the criminal law so as to match 
means (doctrines) and ends (values) as effectively as possible. At the same time, 
Wechsler’s commitment to a rational and principled body of criminal law matched his 
commitment to prudent legal and social reform.13 The Model Penal Code project thus did 
not aim to remake criminal law from whole cloth, or to subject every doctrine to a single 
ideal. Consistent with the Legal Process approach, Wechsler’s Model Penal Code project 
was more modest. As Henry Hart put it, describing legal decisionmaking in general, it was 
a project of “Where-do-we-go-from-here?”14 In drafting the Code, Wechsler was deter-
                                                          
 9. And vice versa. It seems unlikely that Wechsler’s jurisprudential views were unaffected by his work on 
the doctrinal problems of substantive criminal law. 
 10. This is not to say that Legal Process theory lacked philosophical foundations. See Charles L. Barzun, The 
Forgotten Foundations of Hart & Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 (2013). It is to say that Legal Process theory tended 
to eschew idealistic exhortation in favor of prudential reform. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV.C-D. 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV.C. The commentaries to the Model Penal Code reveal intense philosophical 
debates about doctrinal choices. 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 14. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
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mined to articulate doctrines that could fit in with deeply held and widely accepted expec-
tations of the criminal law. His somewhat paradoxical aim was to create both a principled 
corpus of coherent criminal law doctrine (a principled Code) and a model set of politically 
achievable and administratively workable doctrinal reforms (a prudent Code). The central 
drama of the drafting process and of the resulting Code, then, was a tension between 
Wechsler’s dual commitments to principle and to prudence, the two great Legal Process 
watchwords. 
Wechsler’s approach to criminal law reflected practically all the major themes of 
Legal Process jurisprudence. Legal Process theory conceptualized law not as a set of rules, 
but rather as a system for managing the persistent problems of human interdependence 
through institutional processes, which create norms, apply them, and resolve disputes ac-
cordingly.15 As the Hart and Sacks casebook explained, complex societies inevitably di-
vide these functions among a variety of specialized institutions, giving rise to legislatures, 
executive agencies, courts, and many other official and unofficial bodies.16 The legal pro-
cess writ large is constituted by the regularized interactions of all these institutions, each 
of which operates according to its own internal procedures.17 Writers in the Legal Process 
tradition thus focused careful attention on the proper allocation of decisionmaking author-
ity among different institutions, as well as to the regularized interactions between and 
within different legal bodies.18 This focus on process has misled some commentators into 
thinking that Legal Process jurisprudence eschewed any substantive evaluation of the 
law;19 in fact, the Legal Process approach analyzed legal processes and institutions as a 
means of appraising whether they were actually achieving the ultimate social ends of the 
law.20 The core Legal Process concern, Wechsler’s ultimate aspiration, was to match the 
doctrines, processes, and institutions of law with the full panoply of legitimate social val-
ues.21 
For Wechsler, substantive criminal law was simply that subsection of official 
norms establishing baseline prohibitions against “the deepest injuries that human conduct 
can inflict on individuals and institutions.”22 It requires for its creation and application the 
proper functioning of legislatures, courts, police, prosecutors, departments of correction, 
parole boards, and other official bodies. Hence, one of the major themes of Wechsler’s 
work in criminal law, as of Legal Process theory more generally, was the proper allocation 
                                                          
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 111 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (an un-
edited version of the unpublished 1958 Tentative Edition). 
 15. Id. at cxxxvii, 3. 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at cxxxvii. 
 19. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 589 (1988) (arguing 
that Legal Process made “ultimate questions of legal legitimacy depend on a vision of process divorced from 
substance”). 
 20. For Hart and Sacks, there is an ultimate purpose to the legal process—stated negatively, it is the avoidance 
of violence and social disintegration; stated positively, it is the maximum possible satisfaction of valid human 
desires. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 104. 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 105-07, 111; JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 4-6 (1940) (identifying the “ordering of means and 
ends” as the chief task of legal evaluation and reform). 
 22. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952) [herein-
after Challenge]. 
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of authority among the many official bodies charged with decisionmaking related to crim-
inal law.23 For Wechsler, the task of drafting a substantive criminal code was inseparable 
from determining where to lodge the various decisionmaking functions required of a crim-
inal justice system.24 
The very choice to draft a Model Penal Code reflected Wechsler’s—and the Legal 
Process School’s—commitment to the primacy of the democratic legislature in setting 
overall criminal law policy and doctrine. For Wechsler, the work of crafting substantive 
criminal law was primarily a legislature’s work, not a judicial or executive branch func-
tion.25 The Model Penal Code was meant to provide legislators with a technically sophis-
ticated model, which, upon deliberation, they could adopt in toto, borrow pieces from, or 
simply use as a resource for state-specific reform.26 It was emphatically not meant to be a 
uniform code demanding wholesale adoption.27 Indeed, Wechsler was clear that national 
uniformity was not a goal of the project and would not even be desirable given real and 
legitimate differences in the values of different state populations.28 Value pluralism was 
thus presumed, and in Wechsler’s view, it fell to the people of the states acting through 
their legislatures—and not to judges or to expert panels—to make the value choices re-
quired by criminal codification. 
Nevertheless, on Wechsler’s view, expert legal guidance could aid legislatures in 
creating a code actually suited to achieving the ends desired by the polity. First, legal 
knowledge is necessary to describe the present state of the law so that a proper appraisal 
of existing doctrines and functions can be made.29 Second, Wechsler believed that the 
special competence of lawyers in the precise use of language should be harnessed to make 
the Code as precise and intelligible as possible.30 Legal analytical expertise would be use-
ful to systematize a series of discrete doctrines into a coherent, systematic code—one in 
which different provisions build upon and interact with one another in predictable, con-
sistent, and uniform ways. Most importantly, and most consistently with a key Legal Pro-
cess theme, Wechsler had faith in the distinctive competence of good lawyers to take on 
the concrete problems of human affairs and work through them with practical wisdom until 
viable and just solutions manifest themselves.31 
                                                          
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 24. Herbert Wechsler, American Law Institute II - A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 524 (1954-55) [hereinafter Thoughtful Code] (discussing the symbiotic rela-
tionship between “administration of criminal justice” and the substantive law of crime). 
 25. Wechsler expected that gaps and ambiguities in the code would require judicial elaboration, and he un-
derstood that executive branch interpretation of the code would have significant consequences. Nevertheless, 
Wechsler saw the legislature as the primary—though not exclusive—body suited to make substantive criminal 
law and policy. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 26. See Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Herbert Wechsler, The Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (1968) [hereinafter Codification of Criminal Law] (“[I]t was not the purpose of 
the Institute to achieve uniformity in penal law throughout the nation.”); Herbert Wechsler, The American Law 
Institute: Some Observations on Its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956) [hereinafter Some Obser-
vations] (“By ‘model,’. . . we mean nothing more than formulations that may be suggestive and commend them-
selves to legislative imitation.”). 
 29. See Herbert Wechsler, Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 22 (1956) [hereinafter 
Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law]. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See discussion infra Part IV.D-E. 
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Social science, too, had a role to play in this major legal reform effort. Scientists 
could help determine whether the real-world operation of certain legal processes, in fact, 
brought about the desired results, or instead produced unintended consequences. Wechsler 
also believed that sociology, psychology, and economics may help illuminate whether cer-
tain assumptions, implicit in the law, about how people act and think are accurate or not.32 
What social science could not do, on Wechsler’s account, was determine the ends of crim-
inal law or replace legal concepts with social scientific ones. In addition, Wechsler fiercely 
defended the legal profession’s prerogatives against any attempted encroachments by so-
cial science onto the traditionally legal turf of doctrinal reform. Wechsler’s attitude toward 
social science—openness to its insights coupled with resistance to any submission of law 
to social science—was consistent with the Legal Process School’s generally pragmatic 
engagement with the human sciences.33 
Finally, Wechsler remained humble about the power of substantive criminal law, 
even the most up-to-date code, to achieve broad social aims.34 For him, invocation of the 
criminal law was a last-ditch effort to punish an already harmful violation of social norms. 
Achieving the overall goals of public order and personal security, Wechsler maintained, 
cannot depend on the criminal law alone; other laws and policies are much more important 
than the precise articulation of criminal law.35 “[T]he most satisfactory method of crime 
prevention,” he maintained, “is the solution of the basic problems of government—the 
production and distribution of external goods, education and recreation.”36 
Seeing the Model Penal Code as a distinctively Legal Process project helps clear 
away some misconceptions about the Model Penal Code that have arisen over the years: 
First, the Code has often been presented as a code of substantive criminal law 
only, when it is, in fact, just as much concerned with the key Legal Process theme of the 
allocation of power within the legal system as it is with substantive doctrine.37  
Second, the Code has often been seen as thoroughly utilitarian in its theory of 
punishment, with some emphasizing the Code’s invocation of the deterrence rationale38 
and others emphasizing its commitment to “treatmentism”39 or the rehabilitative ideal. In 
fact, the Code reflects the value pluralism of Wechsler and the Legal Process School 
throughout, and it does not subscribe to any single normative theory of punishment.40 
Third, the Code has been cast as an elitist project bent on thwarting popular re-
tributivism. While there is no denying the elite status of the American Law Institute and 
                                                          
 32. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 1130 (“To the extent—and the extent is large—that legislative choice 
ought to be guided or can be assisted by knowledge or insight gained in the medical, psychological and social 
sciences, that knowledge will be marshalled for the purpose by those competent to set it forth.”).  
 33. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 34. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 1133 (noting the “the intrinsic limitations of the penal law, as distin-
guished from other and less oppressive, more constructive methods of protection and control”). 
 35. See generally Herbert Wechsler, A Caveat on Crime Control, 27 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
629, 637 (1937) [hereinafter Caveat]. 
 36. Id. at 637 (1937). 
 37. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 38. See, e.g., Gerald Leonard, Toward a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine 
from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 813-15 (2003). 
 39. DUBBER, supra note 4, at 11. 
 40. See discussion infra IV.C. 
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the drafters of the Code, Wechsler was a committed democrat who, in good Legal Process 
style, believed in legislative primacy in setting criminal law policy.41 
Fourth, some commentators have alleged that the Code aimed to ambitiously re-
make the criminal law along scientific and technocratic lines while taking its cues from 
then-fashionable theories in the social sciences, particularly in psychiatry.42 To the con-
trary, Wechsler had a very humble sense of what the Code could accomplish and never 
saw the natural or social sciences as models for law to emulate.43 Although he welcomed 
relevant social science findings, Wechsler pushed back against the radical critiques of 
criminal law emanating from some social scientists, particularly from psychiatrists, and 
against attempts to render legal issues in the terms of other disciplines. He had a very Legal 
Process faith in the virtue of lawyerly practical wisdom and a concomitant skepticism of 
thoroughly empiricist or theoretical social science.44 
Finally, the Code has been presented as hyper-systematic and almost formalistic 
in its close hewing to a few axiomatic principles,45 while at the same time it has stood 
accused of being overly pragmatic in its accommodations to pre-existing doctrines.46 
These two opposing misconceptions together do point to a real tension in the Code, a clash 
between the Code’s principled and prudential aspirations. Some of the Code’s provisions 
reveal Wechsler’s genuine commitment to principle, while others reveal his temperamen-
tal prudence. Looking at the Code as a whole, one can see this pervasive tension between 
principle and prudence as a reflection of the two diverging lodestars of Legal Process 
thought.47 
In these days when criminal justice reform is again a pervasive topic of conver-
sation in the legal profession and in the wider public sphere,48 revisiting the animating 
philosophy of the Model Penal Code has particular import. Beyond the specific doctrinal 
articulations of the Code itself, it is the approach that Wechsler and his colleagues took to 
criminal law reform that is particularly instructive.49 That approach combined the juridical 
virtues of principled and practical reasoning, receptivity to insights from other disciplines 
and professions, and sincere humility about both the role of legal elites in legislative re-
form and the achievable aims of any single program of doctrinal revision. If the legal pro-
fession hopes to have any distinct influence on the course of contemporary criminal justice 
reform, it would do well to revisit the most successful criminal law reform effort in Amer-
ican history. 
                                                          
 41. See discussion infra IV.B. The Code is also shot through with retributivist rationales in addition to utili-
tarian ones. See discussion infra notes 78, 196, 199, 203, 251, 260 and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., Dubber, Penal Panopticon, supra note 4, at 83 (“The legitimacy of a model code can no longer 
flow as naively and directly from science as it did in the days of the original Code.”). 
 43. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See DUBBER, supra note 4, at 17-18. 
 46. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 518 (2000) 
(lamenting the Code’s “continuing criminal ban on prostitution, underage sexuality, seduction, plural marriages, 
and other ‘victimless’ crimes”). 
 47. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 48. See generally Jennifer Steinhauer, Bipartisan Push Builds to Relax Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 
29, 2015, at A1. 
 49. See Some Observations, supra note 28, at 394 (“If we have erred in the details, we do submit at least that 
the philosophy is right.”). 
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II. WECHSLER, LEGAL REALISM, AND CRIMINAL LAW BEFORE THE WAR 
 
Herbert Wechsler (1909-2000) was the quintessential mid-twentieth century fig-
ure in American law. Legal Realist and New Dealer in the 1930s, wartime administrator 
in the 1940s,50 Legal Process scholar in the 1950s and early 1960s, and Warren Court-era 
civil rights/civil liberties litigator51—Wechsler managed to embody the elite legal ethos 
of every decade of the mid-twentieth century. In this Part, I will briefly provide some 
background on Wechsler’s career in the 1930s, during which Wechsler’s work on criminal 
law reflected many of the jurisprudential currents associated with American Legal Real-
ism, and laid the groundwork for his post-War work on criminal law amid the flowering 
of Legal Process Theory. 
By his own account, Wechsler’s entrée into legal academia came amid the larger 
intellectual transition from Langdellian formalism to a newly self-conscious Legal Realist 
movement.52 When Wechsler matriculated there in 1928, Columbia Law School was on 
the front lines of the rocky shift to Realism.53 Already in 1923, Herman Oliphant had 
urged the Law School to shift the focus of its legal training from the Langdellian caselaw 
model to a more “functional” and social science-heavy approach.54 Oliphant and other 
like-minded faculty members proposed a radically transformed curriculum free of the tra-
ditional common law topics and organized around broad “functional” subject matters (Fa-
milial Relations, Political Relations, and Business Relations) corresponding to the social 
science disciplines of sociology, political science, and economics.55 The debate over the 
new curriculum, along with a controversy over replacing the dean—Oliphant himself had 
hoped to lead the Law School—ended in disappointment for Oliphant and his faction of 
radical reformers.56 The curricular proposal was not implemented; Oliphant was passed 
over for the deanship; and soon thereafter, Oliphant and three other prominent social sci-
ence-inclined colleagues left Columbia.57 
Though Oliphant’s proposed refashioning of the Law School failed, the intellec-
tual ferment of the 1920s did not die out at Columbia, for those who remained, including 
                                                          
 50. Starting in 1940, Wechsler held a number of positions in the U.S. Department of Justice before being 
confirmed as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the War Division. Immediately following the War, 
Wechsler served as chief legal advisor to the American judge Francis Biddle at the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg. Malick W. Ghachem & Daniel Gordon, From Emergency Law to Legal Process: Herbert 
Wechsler and the Second World War, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 333, 337, 372 n.240 (2007). 
 51. Wechsler successfully represented the New York Times in the landmark civil rights and First Amendment 
case New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 
66 ALA. L. REV. 229 (2014). 
 52. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 857-64. 
 53. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 
137 (1983) (“[T]he frontier of legal scholarship during the 1920s was at Columbia.”). 
 54. See JULIUS GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 298-99 (1955). 
 55. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 48-54 (2d ed. 2012) 
(first edition published in 1973); see also JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 15-17 (1995). 
 56. See TWINING, supra note 55, at 52-55. 
 57. See id. 
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most prominently Karl Llewellyn, were Legal Realists themselves.58 A defense of Lang-
dellian formalism was conspicuously lacking at Columbia during the curriculum debate of 
the 1920s. Rather, the schism pit two visions of Realism against one another: the dedicated 
social science empiricism of Oliphant against a broader anti-formalism orientated toward 
rethinking doctrinal categories and critiquing orthodox depictions of legal reasoning.59 
Wechsler was dubious of the more radical faction associated with Oliphant and those who 
left.60 Instead, he pointed to Llewellyn and two relative newcomers to the faculty—Julius 
Goebel and Jerome Michael—as his foremost influences during his time as a law stu-
dent.61 Wechsler’s identification with Llewellyn, Goebel, and Michael is thoroughly con-
sistent with his (and their) brand of Realism, which was dedicated to doctrinal reform and 
critique, but not to the kind of full-fledged social science research agenda promoted by 
Oliphant and others. 
What exactly constituted the essence of the broad Legal Realist movement, with 
which Wechsler associated himself during the 1930s, remains highly contested to this 
day,62 but Wechsler’s own articulation of the “four articles of faith” he developed as a law 
student (and maintained throughout his career) represents at least one recognizably Realist 
platform. These four articles, as expressed by Wechsler, were: 
 
(1) “frontal challenge to the concept of the common law as a closed system”; 
(2) “judicial receptivity to statutory changes of the common law and sympathetic 
treatment of administrative agencies entrusted with new regulatory func-
tions”; 
(3) “unqualified disdain for the then-dominant interpretation of the Constitution 
by the Supreme Court”; and an 
(4) “affirm[ation] that legal understanding is imperfectly attained, so long as law 
is treated as an independent discipline consisting solely of an ordering of 
rules and doctrines drawn from statutes and decisions.”63 
                                                          
 58. See id. at 56. Much of this institutional drama was playing out just before and during the years that 
Wechsler was a standout student at Columbia Law School (1928-1931). See Oral History, supra note 5, at 856-
64. Wechsler edited the Columbia Law Review and graduated in 1931, the year that his professor Karl Llewellyn 
published the canonical defense of Legal Realism against criticism by Roscoe Pound. Id.; Karl Llewellyn, Some 
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
 59. Twining dubbed the two factions as the Scientists (Oliphant, William Underhill Moore, William O. Doug-
las, Hessel E. Yntema, and Leon C. Marshall, etc.) and the Prudents (the rest of the reformist faculty, including 
Karl Llewellyn). See TWINING, supra note 55, at 54. It would also be accurate to say that the schism at Columbia 
pit two visions for the future of Columba Law School against one another. The empiricists championed a thor-
oughly academic research institution, while the remainder of the faculty, though favoring curricular reform, held 
fast to Columbia’s function as an elite professional training institute. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 55, at 17. The 
division between academic and professional orientations remains a deep source of tension at elite American law 
schools to this day. 
 60. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 861. 
 61. See id. at 863. 
 62. Indeed, in the article usually cited as providing the most cogent articulation of Realism at the time, Llew-
ellyn already rejected the suggestion that there was any “school” of Realists or any Realist “creed.” See Llewel-
lyn, supra note 58, at 1233 (“There is no school of Realists.”). He insisted that disagreements among so-called 
Realists were as great as those which the Realists had with Langdell. Id. at 1234. Instead, he characterized Real-
ism as a “movement in thought and work about law”—a skeptical “method of attack” on traditional dogmas that 
shared some overlapping “points of departure” and exhibited some “cross-relevance.” Id. at 1234-35. 
 63. Oral History, supra note 5, at 864. For a slightly more detailed elaboration of these four theses, see 
Herbert Wechsler, The Law Schools and the Law, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., June 1967, at 4-7. The fourth thesis, 
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One may debate whether Wechsler’s four articles of faith perfectly capture the 
essence or “core claim” of Legal Realism.64 But there is no doubt that they place Wechsler 
firmly in the mainstream of the Realist camp and even more clearly in opposition to Lang-
dellian formalism and the legal laissez-faire of the Lochner Era Supreme Court, the two 
bêtes noires of American Legal Realism.65 
Wechsler’s work on criminal law in the 1930s bears all the markings of the broad 
Realist movement with which he identified—a commitment to rethinking traditional com-
mon law doctrinal categories; a reformist urge to modify the law via legislation; and an 
interest in non-legal materials, primarily social science, to understand the social problems 
law seeks to regulate, as well as the consequences of existing legal practices.66 American 
substantive criminal law in the 1930s was considered an intellectual backwater,67 and in 
practice, it retained a jumble of poorly defined common law concepts inherited from Eng-
land and a century-and-a-half’s accretion of post-Revolutionary reforms, all overlaid with 
ad hoc legislative reactions to the crime wave following Prohibition.68 As a subject matter, 
it lacked professional or academic prestige and was not even taught at Columbia when 
Wechsler joined the faculty.69 It was thus somewhat surprising that Wechsler devoted the 
bulk of his scholarly energy to criminal law during his first decade as a legal academic. 
Nevertheless, upon becoming a professor, Wechsler worked with his mentor Jerome Mi-
chael to develop a new mandatory first-year course in criminal law, a project which would 
ultimately result in the publication of the watershed criminal law casebook by Wechsler 
and Michael.70 At the same time, Wechsler and Michael co-wrote a “monumental” two-
part article on the law of homicide which set the groundwork for many of the most prom-
inent features of the Model Penal Code project.71 
                                                          
whose meaning is somewhat cryptic on first reading, was in fact a demand for “more and better information than 
the law reports revealed about what actually happened in the name of the law, including the effects of legal 
processes and institutions on the people and society they are designed to serve.” Id. at 5. In short, the fourth thesis 
expressed Wechsler’s interest in social science and other empirical reports insofar as they bear on legal matters. 
 64. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 15, 21, 24 (2007) (arguing that the “core claim” of Legal Realism is that “judges respond primarily 
to the stimulus of facts,” which is to say that “the judge has non-legal reasons . . . for deciding the way she does”). 
 65. Wechsler himself recognized that the Realists were more “united in terms of what they were against” than 
in terms of what they were for. Oral History, supra note 5, at 871. 
 66. See id. at 872 (“The part of the [Realist] movement that was vital and significant was the part that focused 
not on more accurate empirical description, but on better normative determination.”). 
 67. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 1098-1100. 
 68. See id.; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 943, 947 (1999) (describing early twentieth century American criminal law as “archaic, inconsistent, and 
unprincipled”); Leonard, supra note 38, at 809 (noting consensus that the “inherited criminal law was a chaotic, 
irrational, arbitrary, leftover mélange of ad hoc case law and badly drafted statutes”). 
 69. See Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the Criminal 
Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217, 227-28 (2009); see also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE 
CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOL (Steve Sheppard ed., 2008) (discussing the low prestige of 
criminal law as a professional specialty and as a subject in law school). 
 70. See Walker, supra note 69, at 226-30. 
 71. Charles Fried, Keynote Speaker: Charles Fried ‘60, COLUM. L. SCH. (May 21, 2015), http://web.law.co-
lumbia.edu/graduation/2015/keynote-address.; Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of 
Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 703-08 (1937) [hereinafter Rationale I]; Jerome Michael & Her-
bert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261 (1937) [hereinafter Rationale 
II]. 
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Published in two parts in 1937, “A Rationale for the Law of Homicide,” co-au-
thored by Wechsler and Michael, is one of the most influential articles in criminal law of 
the twentieth century.72 The task Wechsler and Michael set themselves was a fundamental 
rethinking of the two basic questions of homicide law: What homicides or homicidal be-
havior ought to be criminalized, and how should the criminal law differentiate among 
homicide crimes for purposes of classification and treatment (punishment)?73 The method 
they chose to attack those questions was notable, for they did not start with a philosophical 
blank slate and try to build up a normative theory of criminal law or punishment generally. 
Rather, they began with an analytical description of American and English homicide law 
as it then existed, trying to divine the purposes animating the law and to determine whether 
the doctrine was well suited to achieving those purposes.74 Finding the existing doctrinal 
distinctions “shadowy”75 at best, they proceeded to lay out the “considerations” they 
deemed most pertinent to constructing an efficacious homicide code.76 The result was nei-
ther a work of abstract philosophy, nor a work of advocacy for any concrete proposal for 
legislative reform.77 Rather, Wechsler and Michael wrote in an almost conditional tense: 
If these are the ends we seek from our homicide law—e.g., deterrence, reformation, or 
incapacitation—then these are the distinctions our law of homicide needs to make.78 So 
although Wechsler and Michael did not set out to justify the normative ends of homicide 
law or determine the precise doctrinal means for achieving such ends, they insisted that 
matching doctrinal means to ends was the task at hand.79 The “one thing which can be 
                                                          
 72. Yale Kamisar, I Remember Professor Wechsler, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 249, 249 (2009) (describing the 
Rationale I & II as “an overpowering two-part article on the law homicide, probably the longest article, and 
certainly the most significant one, ever written on the subject”). 
 73. See Caveat, supra note 35, at 630 (“The two major problems of the substantive law are those of deter-
mining what behavior should be declared to be criminal and what to do with persons who are convicted of en-
gaging in such behavior.”). 
 74. See Rationale I, supra note 71, at 702-29. 
 75. Id. at 721. 
 76. See Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1263 n.8 (“Our purpose is to formulate the problems, and so far as 
possible, to state the governing critical considerations, not to construct an ideal system.”). 
 77. And it certainly did not involve any empirical work of the kind Oliphant had championed. 
 78. Wechlser and Michael explicitly eschewed retributive theory in this article. See Rationale I, supra note 
71, at 730 n.126 (“[W]e are, of course, rejecting the contention that the penal law should serve the end of retri-
bution.”). For more discussion of Wechsler’s evolving views regarding retributive theories of criminal law, see 
generally Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal Code, and the Uses of Re-
venge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017 (2009). 
 79. Oral History, supra note 5, at 869 (noting that the goal was to make “a good deal of progress towards 
systemization, clarification and improvement” of the criminal law). Of course, to say that Wechsler and Michael 
did not propose a particular scheme of homicide law is not to say that they did not make any substantive conclu-
sions. To the contrary, assuming that “the protection of life” was the primary purpose of homicide law, the au-
thors made a number of inter-related arguments about what kinds of acts ought to be criminalized pursuant to a 
homicide statute , as well as what types of factors ought to affect the classification of homicidal behavior and its 
punishment. Indeed, many of the key concepts later employed by the Model Penal Code were presaged in the 
article’s discussions of mental states, volition, and affirmative defenses. The most notable attempt to summarize 
their conclusions was the chart within the article setting forth the “factors” they deemed to be “of major signifi-
cance in ordering the severity of punitive treatment of persons who have engaged in criminally homicidal behav-
ioral.” Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1300. There is nothing like a model piece of legislation setting out the range 
of homicide crimes and related sentencing in the article. But Wechsler and Michael explicitly stated their hope 
that the article would have some “larger value of clarifying the task of penal code revision as a whole,” Rationale 
I, supra note 71, at 702, and years later, Wechsler made clear that they were specifically trying “to influence” 
the ALI’s nascent efforts to draft a Model Penal Code, a project which would in fact start up in earnest only when 
Wechsler himself took the helm in 1952. Oral History, supra note 5, at 869. 
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said with certainty about any body of criminal law,” they wrote, “whatever its character-
istics: the discriminations which it makes ought to be well adapted to their purposes.”80 
As much as Wechsler believed that criminal law reform was necessary and over-
due by the mid-1930s, and as much as he was committed to the heavy lifting it would 
require, he was also quite cognizant of the limits of legal reform in general and of substan-
tive criminal law reform in particular. As he explained in a short article published in 1937, 
the correct articulation of the substantive law of homicide was only one, and probably not 
the most important, means for protecting society against unlawful killings.81 The ends of 
the criminal law, as Wechsler conceived them, were best pursued through general policies 
of social amelioration—including the provision of better education, employment, and rec-
reation opportunities to all citizens.82 According to Wechsler, the immediate “crime prob-
lem” of the 1920s and 1930s—i.e., the surge in criminality following Prohibition—was a 
mixed blessing for the critical and overdue project of substantive criminal law reform. On 
the one hand, it led to “vociferous enthusiasm for getting something done.”83 On the other 
hand, the public frenzy stirred up by the crime wave, and especially its sensationalization 
by the press and by Hollywood, increased the expectations for criminal law reform to result 
in quick and dramatic drops in anti-social behavior.84 In the face of popular demands for 
more punitive criminal laws and for more spectacular law enforcement action, Wechsler 
urged caution. The social forces that cause upticks in criminal activity, he suggested, could 
not necessarily be reversed by reforms to criminal law or its enforcement.85 And even if 
certain criminal activity could be marginally mitigated by more aggressive policing or by 
harsher criminal laws, Wechsler pressed his readers to consider whether the costs of such 
policies were really worth the amelioration in crime rates.86 Those costs, according to 
Wechsler, included not only the possibility of corruption and abuse on the part of newly 
empowered law enforcement officers, but also, even absent such corruption or abuse, a 
general diminution of individual freedom and the criminalization of socially worthwhile 
activity.87 It is not that Wechsler doubted the usefulness of criminal law reform; to the 
contrary, he was committed to it. However, he was particularly dubious of the anti-crime 
crusades of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, New York Governor Herbert Lehman, and spe-
cial prosecutor Thomas Dewey.88 He wanted to emphasize that criminal law, even coupled 
                                                          
 80. Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1305. It would be difficult to find a better formulation of the functional 
approach to law shared by most American anti-formalists and described by Llewellyn as “an insistence on eval-
uation of any part of law in terms of its effects.” Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 1237. 
 81. See Caveat, supra note 35, at 636-37. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 630. 
 84. Id. at 629-30 (arguing against the “popular faith” in criminal law reform and expressing doubt that such 
reforms can “cut as deeply into the tough tissues of crime as the public has been led to suppose”). 
 85. Id. at 636. 
 86. Caveat, supra note 35, at 635. (“Such measures may make it easier to catch criminals; they may also 
achieve other results ranging from the industrial blacklist and the shooting of wrongly suspected persons to the 
facilitation of a fascist coup d’etat.”). 
 87. See id. at 632. 
 88. See id. at 629; see also BURTON PERETTI, NIGHTCLUB CITY: POLITICS AND AMUSEMENT IN MANHATTAN 
158-59 (2007) (detailing Gov. Lehman’s “proposed draconian crime-prevention reform” and describing the pros-
ecution of mobsters brought by Thomas Dewey). 
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with its proper enforcement, was only one part of the much larger social picture that af-
fected the amount of anti-social activity.89 “There is,” he wrote, 
 
a genuine sense in which a society can justify its use of the rigorous 
methods of the criminal law only to the extent that it makes as full use 
as possible of less rigorous methods of preventing crime, including those 
inherent in the promotion of economic justice, education and the like, 
ends which are desirable in themselves as well as desirable as a means 
to the prevention of crime.90 
 
For Wechsler, improving the substantive criminal law was important, but he in-
sisted that such reform, while necessary, could not be sufficient to achieving the aims of 
criminal law. This emphasis on the limits of black-letter law would stay with Wechsler 
throughout his career as a legal academic and doctrinal reformer. 
Two other features of Wechsler’s writings on criminal law in the 1930s deserve 
notice: his value pluralism and his attitude toward social science. First, he was emphatic 
that the aims served by the criminal law were plural.91 While clearly more sympathetic to 
deterrence theory over other rationales, Wechsler nevertheless noted that the legitimate 
ends of punishment are multiple and that it is impossible to rationally reconcile them all. 
For instance, “the best methods of terrifying potential offenders are likely to be the worst 
means for reforming actual offenders.”92 Hence, the debate between deterrence and refor-
mation was one that “represents a genuine antinomy,” Wechsler and Michael wrote.93 As 
both prevention and rehabilitation constitute legitimate ends of punishment, “there is no 
answer to this problem [of reconciling them] for all times and all places if, indeed, there is 
one for any time and place.”94 The best policymakers can do is endeavor to prudently 
balance between them.95 
Wechsler’s writings in the 1930s also reveal both a deep interest in social science 
for the insights it could contribute to legal reform and a corresponding skepticism about 
the credibility of social science’s claims to expertise.96 Wechsler did not believe that un-
derstanding law, much less reforming it, was simply a matter of understanding empirical 
reality. He worried that the nascent American Law Institute effort  to draft a Model Penal 
                                                          
 89. See Caveat, supra note 35, at 637 (“[T]he most satisfactory method of crime prevention is the solution of 
the basic problems of government—the production and distribution of external goods, education and recrea-
tion.”); Rationale I, supra note 71, at 731-32, n.128 (noting that the only “means [to reducing undesirable behav-
ior] that can be employed on a wide scale are measures designed to promote education, health, recreation, and 
economic security”). 
 90. See Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1299 n.93. 
 91. See id. at 1262 (noting  the “obvious multiplicity of treatment ends”). 
 92. See Caveat, supra note 35, at 634. 
 93. See Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1325. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (“The problem is not whether the compromise shall be made but what its terms shall be.”). See also 
id. at. 1262 (“[N]o program for the determination of methods of treatment, no set of criteria for their evaluation, 
can ignore this obvious multiplicity of treatment ends.”). 
 96. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 861, 871 (criticizing what Wechsler called the “more extreme group at 
Columbia” that focused primarily on “the need for elaborate empirical examination . . . [a]s if the ultimate pur-
pose of the enterprise was to facilitate a more accurate prediction of what judges do”). 
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Code in the 1930s was based on “literally fantastic conceptions” that “somehow . . . the 
reordering of criminal law involved a great empirical exercise.”97 What was needed for 
substantive criminal law reform was not some elaborate quantitative account of observable 
facts—“as though this was going to increase your insight as to whether forcible sexual 
intercourse is something that a good society should try to protect people against”98—but 
rather a clear articulation of value choices and a careful attempt to craft doctrine consistent 
with the value(s) chosen.99 
At the same time, Wechsler was eager to consult social science where it could 
helpfully illuminate empirical questions germane to legal analysis and reform.100 Indeed, 
the casebook he and Michael published in 1940 was precedent-setting in the amount of 
social science materials it included and its forthright acknowledgement that such materials 
ought to bear on the issues of criminal law.101 To this end, the casebook cited the leading 
social scientific studies aimed at surveying the roots of crime and the efficacy of various 
crime control techniques.102 And its critical reception, both positive and negative, focused 
on the unprecedented amount of social science materials included in the casebook.103 
But such materials could not, Wechsler maintained, determine one’s evaluation 
of any piece of doctrine or legal practice. First, social science itself could not deliver—at 
least not yet—determinate factual answers to many of the most pressing questions about 
the roots of crime or the efficacy of various crime control measures. As Wechsler and 
Michael wrote, “knowledge of matters of facts, particularly of the crucial sociological and 
psychological facts of law, consists of opinions the relative validity of which it is difficult 
                                                          
 97. Id. at 869 (“I never got very clear on what it was that you were going to count and look at, but the 
techniques of sociology were going to be conscripted.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 872 (“The important point is to be aware of what the value choices are, and so far as possible, 
to be able to articulate the reasons that lead to choosing A rather than B. Why? So that accurate statement can 
enable the next person to know whether he or she goes with you or against you.”). 
 100. JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES, 
STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 6 (1940) (“In the ordering of means and ends one must obviously employ what-
ever knowledge there is of the adaptation of particular means to particular ends, and the question of adaptation 
of means to ends is . . . a question of fact.”); see also Oral History, supra note 5, at 870 (“[Y]ou try to get all the 
information you can get.”). 
 101. For a masterful study of the Michael & Wechsler casebook and its pedagogical roots and effects, see 
Walker, supra note 69, at 218 (“Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, Criminal Law and Its Administration 
became the first law school casebook to successfully synthesize social science materials with cases, inspiring a 
generation of criminal law teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.”). 
 102. See MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1337-60 (listing the secondary sources, many of them 
social science reports, cited by Michael and Wechsler in the casebook). 
 103. The casebook won high praise from David Riesman, then a law professor and soon to be a leading soci-
ologist, for tackling “the job of social science integration” with law so well. David Reisman, Law and Social 
Science: A Report on Michael and Wechsler’s Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE L. J. 
636, 636 (1941). Indeed, Riesman wrote that “Michael and Wechsler make law a social science by being steadily 
comparative, legislative, and jurisprudential—drawing upon the resources of the other social sciences to explain 
comparisons, assist legislation, and give content to jurisprudence.” Id. at 645. In particular, Riesman appreciated 
that “Michael and Wechsler have ransacked the [relevant social science] literature with exceptional thoroughness 
and imagination.” Id. Compare George Wilfred Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (1940) 
(praising the casebook for its emphasis on “social thinking by lawyers”), with Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the 
First Edition, ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE xiv (1952) 
(implicitly criticizing the Michael & Wechsler casebook for containing too many non-legal materials at the ex-
pense of more practical instruction in doctrine). 
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or impossible to measure.”104 Despite the claims of psychiatrists, sociologists, and others 
to understand the key factors driving crime and how to diminish it, “they all overstate their 
knowledge and take only a partial view of the problem. The unwelcome truth may be that 
there is no genuine solution to the ultimate dilemmas of treatment, because there is no 
knowledge sufficient to guide a rational choice.”105 Second, even in those areas where one 
could rely on factual or common-sense assumptions about human behavior, disagreements 
about values would remain. As they explained, “that life imprisonment is well adapted to 
rendering the persons subjected to it incapable of committing crimes outside of prison is 
obviously indicated by common knowledge,”106 but “whether or not the incapacitation of 
persons convicted of crime . . . is desirable, undesirable, or more or less desirable than 
some alternative state of affairs is a question of value rather than of fact.”107 For such 
value questions, factual resolution was conceptually impossible and the “assertion, evalu-
ation, and exploration of such propositions is the province of politics and also of ethics.”108 
In sum, given both the limits of empirical social science and the philosophical 
dilemmas of value pluralism, Wechsler in the 1930s urged his fellow criminal law reform-
ers to be humble regarding their ability to achieve dramatic social change. Moreover, 
Wechsler maintained that even a perfectly reformed code of criminal law could provide 
only a limited tool for achieving its aims. Nevertheless, Wechsler felt that public-oriented 
lawyers like himself had a deep obligation to “clarify” the law as best they could using all 
the ethical, analytical, and empirical tools they could muster toward good judgment.109 
Along with his caution and sense of humility, Wechsler of the 1930s was very much an 
unapologetic legal reformer and a proud New Deal supporter. 
 
III. THE POST-WAR MOOD AND THE SHIFT TO LEGAL PROCESS 
 
The demands of government service took Wechsler away from any sustained 
work on substantive criminal law reform for the bulk of the 1940s, and the American Law 
Institute’s own efforts at convening a Model Penal Code project was put on hold through-
out this time.110 Nevertheless, some account of the shift in mood in elite legal academia 
between the 1930s and the 1950s is in order, for the transition from Legal Realism to Legal 
                                                          
 104. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 6. As an example, Wechsler wrote that the science of psy-
chology still cannot tell us which criminals are “corrigible”—i.e., capable of reformation—and which are not. 
Id. at 15 n.42. And in Caveat, Wechsler wrote scornfully that “crime conferences fostered the belief that because 
they were attended by ‘scientists’ and ‘experts’ any proposals made by them proceeded from a fund of knowledge 
adequate, or nearly adequate, to solve the practical problems of crime control.” Caveat, supra note 35, at 629. 
Needless to say, Wechsler did not believe that the fund of knowledge brought by “experts” and “scientists” was 
sufficient. 
 105. Caveat, supra note 35, at 634. 
 106. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 4. 
 107. Id. at 5. 
 108. Id. Wechsler and Michael went on to discuss whether there were answers to questions of value that were 
“anything more than a personal preference.” Id. Somewhat murkily, they concluded that, yes, one can make value 
choices on some “broader basis than personal preference” if “it is possible, as we think it is, to achieve some 
grasp of the fundamental and permanent in human desires.” Id. 
 109. Rationale I, supra note 71, at 702 (identifying “the larger value of clarifying the task of penal code revi-
sion as a whole”). 
 110. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 917. 
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Process theory is subject to considerably different interpretations.111 Indeed, one could tell 
a story of Legal Realism’s demise and the subsequent rise of Legal Process as a tale of two 
distinct and opposing approaches to law.112 But the narrative one grasps through tracing 
Wechsler’s career is not one of the eclipse of Realism by Process theory, but rather Process 
theory as a post-New Deal, post-War elaboration of certain Realist themes. 
The experience of living through the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World 
War II in rapid succession must be counted among the many factors involved in the gen-
erational transition from Legal Realism to Legal Process theory. Importantly, there was a 
sense on the part of many Realists that, by the early 1940s, their approach had tri-
umphed.113 Wechsler’s Four Theses had been vindicated in the collapse of Lochner Era 
Constitutional jurisprudence, the proliferation of New Deal statutes and regulations, and 
the mainstreaming of legislative and social science perspectives into the law school cur-
riculum.114 Many prominent Realists went to Washington to serve in the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, often taking leading roles in the construction of the New Deal regulatory state 
and, later, in the war effort.115 By the end of World War II, Realists occupied the com-
manding heights of the federal courts, regulatory agencies, and—as they trickled back to 
campus—legal academia. A shift in emphasis, a jump to new areas of interest, was thus 
natural for Realist-identified lawyers.116 
In particular, for many of the Realists who had served in Washington during the 
New Deal or during the war, the process of governance itself became a focus of attention. 
By the end of World War II, the American government was larger, more complex, and 
seemingly more powerful and effective than it had ever been. But how exactly the prolif-
erating parts of the New Deal state fit together into an integral system of governance—
which institutions were responsible for which official acts—was still very much a work in 
progress. The New Deal and war mobilization put stress on familiar understandings of 
federalism, separation of powers, and the role of federal and state courts in resolving dis-
putes spawned by the newly empowered regulatory state. Wechsler and Henry Hart of 
Harvard Law School both served in Washington through the war,117 and upon their return 
to legal academia, they set about to reconsider the state of American federalism generally 
                                                          
 111. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-299 (1995) (offering an 
intellectual history of Process jurisprudence as one that “parallels if not precedes legal realism itself”); G. Edward 
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 
279 (1973) (providing the first thorough interpretation of the shift from Realism to “Reasoned Elaboration”). 
 112. See DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 212 (“Why . . . is the move toward process thinking regarded generally 
as a response to the failure of realism?”). 
 113. There was also a sense that Realism as a critical project had run its course. See White, supra note 111, at 
282. But Wechsler certainly believed that his four theses were vindicated during the mid-twentieth century. See 
Herbert Wechsler, The Law School and the Law, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., July 1967, at 4, 5 (“These articles of faith 
sustained me in my youth, and I make bold to say that they have won acceptance in the intervening years.”). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See BRIAN TAMANAHA: BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 94 (2010) (listing the many Realists 
who took government roles during the 1930s, 1940s, and thereafter). 
 116. The 1947 call by Myres McDougal at Yale “to emerge from the destructive phase of legal scholarship—
indispensable though the destruction was—and to center [the law school’s] energies upon conscious efforts to 
create the institutions, doctrines and practices of the future” seems to capture the post-War mood of Realist-
identified legal academics. Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy 
Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1349 (1947). 
 117. During the War, Hart served as associate general counsel of the Office of Price Administration. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2036 (1994). 
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and, in particular, the federal judiciary’s place in the transformed American system of 
governance. In this new mood, questions related to the special competence of federal 
courts, their internal organization, and the relationship of the federal judiciary to other 
official bodies (federal and state) took center stage.118 Just as Wechsler and Michael’s 
Criminal Law casebook took a legislative perspective on the issues of substantive criminal 
law, so too did Hart and Wechsler set out to tackle “issues of legislative policy” entrusted 
to Congress “without depreciating the importance of the problems facings courts.”119 The 
resulting Federal Courts and the Federal System casebook not only defined a new field in 
legal academia, it was widely hailed at the time and thereafter as “beautiful and brilliant—
probably the most important and influential casebook ever written.”120 
The publication of Hart and Wechsler’s casebook in 1953 and its reception sig-
naled the decisive shift to a new process-oriented mood of legal inquiry, especially at Har-
vard and Columbia Law Schools.121 Through his collaboration with Henry Hart, Wechsler 
was up-to-date on jurisprudential developments at Harvard Law School where Hart, Lon 
Fuller, Paul Freund, Louis Jaffe, and Albert Sacks were all working on books and articles 
with similar themes. These scholars did not self-consciously set out to form a new juris-
prudential school, nor did they promulgate any collective manifesto or mission state-
ment.122 Indeed, it was not until a 1974 article by Bruce Ackerman that the label “Legal 
Process School” came to be used explicitly to denote their work and the prevalent attitude 
among many leading legal academics of the 1950s and 1960s.123 What was that attitude? 
Fixing their attention on the newly enlarged and ever more convoluted post-War 
American state, the Legal Process approach saw law as an “ongoing, functioning, purpos-
ive process” coordinating the activities of a great variety of official and unofficial ac-
tors.124 Law, on this account, is not a set of substantive rules, but is rather a series of 
                                                          
 118. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at xii (“In varying context we pose the issue of what courts are good 
for—and are not good for—seeking thus to open up the whole range of questions as to the appropriate relationship 
between the federal courts and other organs of federal and state government.”). 
 119. Id. at xi, xii. 
 120. Akhil Amar, Law Story: Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 688 (1989) (book review). 
 121. My claim is not that the Hart & Wechsler casebook was the start of the Legal Process School, which 
others have traced back to the late 1930s or even earlier. See DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 210-12. The claim is 
simply that the publication of the Federal Courts casebook was a singularly high-profile event that cemented and 
reflected Legal Process theory’s status as the reigning mode of elite legal academia. Hart and Albert Sacks began 
their collaboration on the Legal Process materials the year after the Hart & Wechsler casebook was published. 
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 117, at 2041. 
 122. Though it is now studied as the most authoritative elaboration of Legal Process theory, the Hart & Sacks 
materials of 1958 do not purport to speak for any new jurisprudential movement or school. “Process jurispru-
dence was never packaged as a discrete theory,” Neil Duxbury observed. DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 206. It 
was instead “founded on attitude rather than strategy . . . an attitude which lent itself perfectly to the tackling of 
legal problems” but also makes Legal Process as a theory “remarkably difficult to pin down.” Id. at 207. 
 123. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 123. The quest for a definition or short summary of American Legal Realism 
has raised similar difficulties, but at least the term Realism was adopted more or less contemporaneously by some 
of those theorists we now commonly deem Realists. See Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 1226-27 n.18, 1235-38 
(listing twenty academics and judges among the ranks of Realists and setting out nine “common points of depar-
ture” or theses shared by Realists). There is no analogous document from the 1950s announcing the existence of 
a Legal Process School or its members. 
 124. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at cxxxvii. It thus aimed to transcend the debates between formalists and 
realists on the one hand and natural lawyers and positivists on the other. Law, on the Legal Process account, is 
neither a closed system of coherent substantive rules (formalism), nor a branch of moral philosophy (natural law), 
nor a prediction of how officials might act (realism), nor a mere sociological fact (positivism). 
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processes for coping with the inherent difficulties of human interdependence.125 Regular-
ized processes are necessary to legitimate the creation, enforcement, and adjudication of 
communal norms, and in larger societies, a plethora of official bodies are involved in car-
rying out and coordinating these multiple processes.126 Writers in the Legal Process tradi-
tion thus focused on the following inter-related themes: 
 
(1) Allocation of Discretion among Legal Institutions: Careful attention must be paid 
to the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority (discretion) among different 
institutions and between different levels of government, as well as to the interac-
tions among these institutions.127 
(2) Law as a Purposive Enterprise: The law is purposive; it aims to achieve social 
ends and should be evaluated according to how well it ultimately achieves those 
ends. 
(3) Value Pluralism: The purposes of law—the range of legitimate social ends—are 
multiple and may come into conflict. 
(4) Prudence: Because law is purposive, legal decisionmakers ought to be prudent 
(practically wise) regarding the particular choices they face, recognizing the lim-
its of their knowledge, power, and authority. 
(5) Rational and Principled Decisionmaking: Legal decisionmakers, particularly 
judges, ought to clearly articulate and neutrally apply the principles justifying 
their decisions.128 
(6) A Limited Role for Social Science in Law: Insights from the social sciences should 
be consulted when they can help make legal processes and outcomes better, but 
legal questions cannot be reduced to empirical or scientific questions. 
(7) Commitment to Democracy: Ultimately, the sovereign citizenry ought to dictate 
the ends to be pursued via law; hence, democratic legislatures are the supreme 
policy-making organs. 
(8) Legitimacy through Procedural Regularity: If an institution appropriately tasked 
with making a certain decision follows its own duly established processes, then 
its decision should be accepted as legally legitimate, even if it is substantively 
wrong, until such decision is changed by duly established processes.129 
 
These eight themes are not meant to be an exhaustive or necessary list of the 
concerns, attitudes, or assumptions of the Legal Process approach to law. Different Legal 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 2. 
 126. Id. at 4. 
 127. Institutional competence is the shorthand often used for this theme. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution 
of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional Competence” Theme: Unintended Consequences For Environmen-
tal Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1052-54 (2006). 
 128. The phrases “reasoned elaboration,” HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 146, and “neutral principles,” 
Neutral Principles, supra note 8, are often used to denote this theme. 
 129. This is known as the “principle of institutional settlement” in the Hart & Sacks casebook. HART & SACKS, 
supra note 14, at 4. 
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Process authors emphasized different theses, and perhaps none of them would have en-
dorsed all of the items on this list. Nevertheless, these eight themes constitute a set of 
features that many Legal Process thinkers argued for, debated, or assumed.130 
As suggested in Part I, Wechsler’s writings on substantive criminal law in the 
1930s already exemplified a number of these themes—value pluralism, a limited role for 
social science, and a certain humility about the project of legal reform. His work in the 
1950s would press these themes in the areas of federal jurisdiction and Constitutional law, 
as well. But it was the great decade-long criminal law reform project in which these theses 
would reveal themselves most pervasively. 
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE AS LEGAL PROCESS PROJECT 
In 1951, the American Law Institute revived its long-delayed plans for a major 
criminal law project, and Herbert Wechsler was asked to lead the effort, first as chair of 
an advisory committee and then as Chief Reporter.131 Wechsler laid out his vision of the 
project in a short article in the Harvard Law Review in May of 1952, which he hoped 
would “fortify professional support” for the giant project he was about to lead.132 Stressing 
the need for a comprehensive model penal code project, the article rehearsed many of the 
points Wechsler and Michael had made about the sorry state of criminal law doctrine in 
the 1930s—that the subject had remained neglected for too long by reformers and scholars 
in the United States and that the current doctrine was full of common law-derived anach-
ronisms, conceptual confusions, and inexplicable quirks. Recognizing that some worth-
while reforms had been attempted “unevenly”133 here and there in the area of criminal 
procedure and in sentencing policies, Wechsler argued that the time was ripe—perhaps 
now even overdue—for a comprehensive and systematic re-examination of substantive 
criminal law. Criminal law “should surely be as rational and just as law can be,” wrote 
Wechsler. “Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the community and the 
individual.”134 
The Model Penal Code project occupied the bulk of Wechsler’s professional en-
ergy for a solid decade—from 1952 until the publication in 1962 of the Proposed Official 
Draft.135 Wechsler was the Chief Reporter and acknowledged lead drafter of the Code, but 
Wechsler also recruited a large, eminent, and diverse cast to serve as special consultants, 
research associates, and advisory committee members. The group included leading legal 
academics, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, corrections officials, psychiatrists, crim-
inologists, and professors of sociology and social work.136 Small groups were set up to 
                                                          
 130. Indeed, some of these features appear to be in tension with one another, a theme I will explore in Part 
IV.D. 
 131. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 917-18. 
 132. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1098. The article was itself based on two memoranda he prepared for the 
American Law Institute advisory committee over the previous year. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 918. 
 133. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1099. 
 134. Id. at 1098. 
 135. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 918 (“From 1952 until the Code was completed—that is to say, for ten 
years—the development of the Model Penal Code absorbed every bit of time and energy that I had.”). This is an 
amazing statement given what else Wechsler accomplished during those years. 
 136. MODEL PENAL CODE iv-vi (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter MPC] (list of the 
Reportorial Staff). One surprising name on the list is the literary and cultural critic Lionel Trilling. Id. at vii. 
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handle particular issues, and draft proposals of various sections were released almost an-
nually up until the complete Proposed Official Draft was published in May of 1962.137 
Throughout the decade of work, Wechsler published occasional updates on the project, 
and more remarkably, remained as productive as ever in legal-academic work unrelated to 
criminal law. 
The years between 1952 and 1962 were also the prime years of Legal Process 
theory’s reign in American legal academia.138 Indeed, one could well argue that two 
Wechsler productions bookended the golden age of the Legal Process—if Hart & 
Wechsler’s 1953 Federal Courts casebook signaled the ascendency of Legal Process, 
many commentators have cited Wechsler’s Neutral Principles article of 1959 as the mo-
ment when the Legal Process consensus began to fracture.139 It is no surprise, then, that 
the Model Penal Code reflects the major themes of the Legal Process approach to law, and 
in this section I will show why the Code may justly be described as the “greatest legislative 
achievement of the ‘legal process’ school of thought in American law.”140 
 
A. Division of Functions among Legal Institutions 
 
Laying out the substantive issues to be considered by the project, Wechsler listed 
three overarching questions he and the Code drafters would endeavor to answer: (1) What 
behavior ought to be criminalized, (2) how should the criminal law differentiate among 
crimes for purposes of classification and treatment (punishment), and (3) what methods of 
treatment of offenders ought to be authorized, and in what agency or agencies should dis-
cretion with respect to methods of treatment be lodged?141 The first two questions echoed 
exactly the questions Wechsler had articulated back in 1937; only this time the scope en-
compassed all of criminal law, rather than homicide laws specifically.142 The third ques-
tion, however, revealed the new post-War turn in Wechsler’s thinking. First, it showed that 
Wechsler’s ambition was not limited to rationalizing and systematizing the substantive 
definition and gradation of crimes, but rather extended to sentencing and methods of pun-
ishment as well. Even more pertinently, it demonstrated Wechsler’s application to criminal 
                                                          
Markus Dubber has pointed out that there were no professional academic philosophers or historians involved in 
the project. See Alegitimacy, supra note 4, at 241. 
 137. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 319, 323-24 (2007). 
 138. All of the “classic” works of Legal Process scholarship identified by Charles Barzun, date from this dec-
ade. See Barzun, supra note 10, at 9-10. 
 139. The Legal Philosophy Discussion Group of 1956 at Harvard Law School was arguably the epicenter of 
Legal Process jurisprudence, including as it did Harvard professors Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, Lon Fuller, Paul 
Freund, and visiting professors Herbert Wechsler, H.L.A. Hart, and Julius Stone. See Geoffrey C. Shaw, H. L. A. 
Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666, 689-93 (2013). 
 140. Harold Edgar, Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1347, 1355 
(2000). Markus Dubber made a similar, if more critical, point in considering the ratio of substantive criminal law 
to administrative organization in the Model Penal Code: “Rather than a criminal code with an administrative 
suffix, [the Model Penal Code] is an administrative code with a criminal prefix.” Alegitimacy, supra note 4, at 
252. 
 141. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1104-05. 
 142. See Caveat, supra note 35, at 630 (1937) (“The two major problems of the substantive law are those of 
determining what behavior should be declared to be criminal and what to do with persons who are convicted of 
engaging in such behavior.”). 
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law of the central Legal Process concern with the allocation of discretion across legal in-
stitutions. It confirmed the shift in emphasis to the key post-War question: Who should 
decide and how? 
Legal Process authors accepted the Realist insights that legal adjudication places 
a significant amount of discretion in the hands of legal decisionmakers and that extant 
legal rules do not always rationally determine the outcome of legal disputes. But, for Legal 
Process authors, the existence of discretion was not a fatal problem to the legitimacy of 
legal outcomes because, on their account, the legitimacy of any one decision does not 
depend on its substantive accord with some ideal outcome, but rather on its procedural 
legitimacy.143 Procedural legitimacy, in turn, depends on whether the dispute was heard 
by the right official in the right institution and decided pursuant to the right decision pro-
cedures.144 For Legal Process authors, the merit of a legal system was not that it landed 
on precisely the right substantive outcome to all disputes it faced—such perfection was 
impossible in theory and in fact—but rather that it channeled disputes toward the most 
appropriate resolution mechanisms, including both official and unofficial dispute resolu-
tion procedures.145 Accordingly, Wechsler and his Legal Process cohort focused great en-
ergy on determining where discretion ought to reside for various types of legal decisions. 
That interest gave rise to a focus on comparative institutional competence,146 for discre-
tion ought to be lodged within the institution best capable of rendering informed and fair 
decisions.147 As Richard Fallon pointed out regarding the Federal Courts casebook, “[a]s 
defined by Hart and Wechsler, the central, organizing question of Federal Courts doctrine 
involves allocations of authority.”148 
In laying out the aims of the Model Penal Code project in his 1952 article, 
Wechsler put precisely this question of the allocation of authority front and center. In par-
ticular, with regard to sentencing, Wechsler posed the question this way: “Since much 
discretion as to treatment is inevitable and desirable, the most important question to be 
faced is in what agency or agencies it ought to be reposed.”149 Wechsler noted that the 
                                                          
 143. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 4 (describing the “principle of institutional settlement”). The legit-
imacy of the system of legal processes, however, does rest on its overall promotion of substantive human ends—
e.g., the maintenance of social order and the maximization of the “total satisfactions of valid human wants.” Id. 
at 104-05. 
 144. See id. at 4. 
 145. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 920 (2003) 
(“For Hart & Sacks, the purpose of judges, indeed of law itself, is to allocate decisionmaking authority among 
competing institutions.”). 
 146. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 254 (1992). 
 147. Related to this interest in the allocation of discretion, Legal Process authors also recognized the important 
distinction between black-letter rules and more open-ended standards. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 139-
41. Wechsler too paid careful attention to this distinction in criminal law, both in the drafting of the Model Penal 
Code and even before in the Michael & Wechsler casebook. See Edgar, supra note 140, at 1351 (praising the 
Michael & Wechsler casebook’s explicit treatment of the “advantages and disadvantages of deciding issues by 
rules, as against leaving them to judicial and administrative discretion”); See Legal Scholarship and Criminal 
Law, supra note 29, at 21 (noting that the caselaw is a “gold mine of experience bearing on that most difficult of 
legislative issues—how much to attempt to settle by a solid rule, how much to leave to standards that must gain 
their largest content in their application”). 
 148. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 962 
(1994). 
 149. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1127. 
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drafters would need to consider the relative competences of “courts and other organs of 
administration, e.g., prison authorities, parole boards and correction departments, [and] the 
chief executive.”150 Even novel proposals for completely new institutions ought to be dis-
cussed—for instance, “a “dispositions board that might include the judge but would draw 
personnel of equal weight from social works, psychiatry, penology, and education.”151 
The focus on the distribution of discretion, the same focus animating the Federal Courts 
casebook, was unmistakable. “What is involved,” Wechsler wrote, “is not alone the ques-
tion of who ought to be empowered to make the decisive judgments as to treatment[,] but 
also when such judgments should be made, the data on which they ought to be founded 
and the policies and objects that should be pursued.”152 In other words, who should decide 
and how? 
In the end, the completed Code made good on Wechsler’s promise to devote con-
siderable attention to the allocation of institutional responsibilities within the criminal jus-
tice system, particularly with respect to sentencing and related matters.153 The Code de-
votes one of its four major parts to the “Organization of Correction”—detailing how state 
departments of correction, along with independent boards of parole, ought to be organized, 
what responsibilities each board or division should have, and what criteria each board or 
division should apply to decisions within their discretion.154 Though they were the least 
influential parts of the Model Penal Code, the sections on sentencing and the organization 
of corrections evinced a meticulous concern with the distribution of authority regarding 
the imposition of punishment (or “treatment” in the preferred terms of the Code). Too 
detailed to describe in full here, the basic sentencing scheme created by the Code for felony 
convictions allowed the judge to impose indeterminate sentences within certain prescribed 
ranges, but generally favored lenient minimum sentences.155 The judge’s primary roles in 
sentencing, then, were determining whether imprisonment would actually be imposed, and 
                                                          
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1128. 
 152. Id. A few years later, in describing the Code project, Wechsler concluded as follows: 
The framework that I have described is offered as a means to the sound distribution of 
responsibility and function among legislature, courts and organs of correction, taking ac-
count of the judgments each is best equipped to make, given the time when it must act, the 
nature of its actions, the type of information that it has available for judgment and the 
dangers of unfairness or abuse. If we have erred in the details, we do submit at least that 
the philosophy is right. 
Some Observations, supra note 28, at 394. 
 153. Wechsler by and large attempted to stay clear of issues traditionally deemed within the province of crim-
inal procedure and already codified as part of the American Law Institute’s Code of Criminal Procedure of 1930. 
Consequently, the Model Penal Code has relatively little to say about the role of police officers, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel at the “front end” of the criminal process. However, the Model Penal Code has much to say 
about the role of judges and correctional institutions on the “back-end” of the criminal process. See MPC Parts 
III-IV. And the Code does contain a few provisions covering topics generally thought of as criminal procedure—
e.g., burden of proof, evidentiary presumption, and competency to stand trial provisions. Robinson & Dubber, 
supra note 137, at 324. 
 154. The four parts of the Code were General Provisions, Definition of Specific Crimes, Treatment and Cor-
rection, and Organization of Correction.  See MPC ix-xxii (Table of Contents). 
 155. Importantly, it allowed for suspension of sentence or probation in every case (other than capital cases), 
and in fact, required the court to forego imprisonment unless it is “of the opinion that . . . imprisonment is nec-
essary for the protection of the public.” MPC § 7.01. To find imprisonment necessary, the court must be of the 
opinion that (a) there is an undue risk that the defendant may commit another crime, (b) the defendant is in need 
of rehabilitation through commitment, or (c) “a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant’s 
crime.” Id. 
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss3/7
WOLITZ_5.5.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016  5:20 PM 
2016] JURISPRUDENTIAL ROOTS OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 655 
if so, choosing a minimum sentence from within the Code-authorized range of minimums 
for the relevant gradation of the offense. After that, the key decisions related to imprison-
ment conditions and parole were left to the department of corrections and an independent 
board of parole respectively.156 The Code allowed for parole any time after completion of 
the minimum sentence (usually one year) and set out both the composition of the parole 
board157 and the criteria the board should employ in making parole determinations.158 The 
detailed provisions related to sentencing and the allocation of carefully guided discretion 
to each official actor in the correction system consumed the largest portion of time and 
energy of the whole project.159 It was “because [the Code] engages the issues of who 
should be deciding what in such pervasive fashion,” that Harold Edgar called the Model 
Penal Code “the greatest legislative achievement of the ‘legal process’ school of thought 
in American law.”160 
 
B. Legislative Primacy 
 
The very choice to draft a model code reflected the Legal Process School’s deep 
commitment to the primacy of the democratic legislature’s role in setting overall criminal 
law policy and doctrine. It is worth disentangling at the outset two distinct, but related 
points: (1) Wechsler’s insistence on legislative reform, as opposed to judicial or prosecu-
torial reforms and (2) Wechsler’s commitment to ultimate democratic control of crime and 
punishment policy. Since the 1930s, Wechsler’s approach to criminal law had been marked 
by a distinctively legislative point of view, in contradistinction to a traditional common-
law judge-centric view.161 He wanted his students of criminal law, as well as his reformist 
colleagues, to consider the fundamental questions of criminal doctrine—e.g., what behav-
ior ought to be criminalized in the first place—as legislators would, rather than simply take 
inherited criminal doctrines as givens in the manner of practicing judges, lawyers, or ad-
ministrators.162 By the twentieth century, the norm of legality in criminal law (nulla poena 
sine lege) was widely accepted, and most crimes were in fact laid out in legislation.163 But 
the codification of common law crimes had occurred haphazardly over the years. And, as 
                                                          
 156. Wechsler argued that the “organs of correction” rather than the courts “are best equipped to make deci-
sions” about how long a prisoner should be incarcerated beyond the statutory minimum because they have more 
specific knowledge “in light of experience and observation” about “the period required for the process of correc-
tion to realize its optimum potentiality” and the “risk of further criminality” for each convicted person. Herbert 
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 476 (1961). 
 157. MPC § 402.1. 
 158. Id.  § 305.9. 
 159. MPC Parts III-IV. 
 160. Edgar, supra note 140, at 1355. 
 161. This is not to say that Wechsler found the work of judges or criminal law practitioners unproblematic. To 
the contrary, he encouraged reforms in criminal law administration by judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and 
other interested parties. But he argued that criminal law administration could only ever be as good as the sub-
stantive law it was set up to administer, and given the many flaws in the inherited substantive law of crime, he 
insisted that a comprehensive rethink of basic substantive criminal legislation was in order. See Thoughtful Code, 
supra note 24, at 524 (“Poor administration will, of course, impoverish the soundest system. Good administration 
may improve a poor one . . . . There are limits to how far administrators can surmount the limitations of the thing 
that they administer.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 19-21. 
 163. See Francis Barry McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 633, 659-62 (1995). 
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Wechsler never tired of pointing out, common law crimes codified into pre-Model Penal 
Code statutes usually left out the definition of key terms or failed to articulate elements at 
all. In practice, then, much of the basic substantive criminal law in many American juris-
dictions remained within the discretion of the judiciary.164 It was that misallocation of 
discretion—allowing judges, rather than the legislature, to determine basic criminal law 
doctrine—that exercised Wechsler greatly.165 The discretion to determine in the first in-
stance what behavior is to be penalized, categorized, and punished was, for Wechsler, a 
distinctly legislative function.166 One of the Code’s chief aims, then, was to bring to deci-
sive completion the long process by which criminal law moved from being a (predomi-
nantly) common law field to a (predominantly) statutory one.167 
The Legal Process authors, Wechsler among them, were by and large legislative 
supremacists.168 For them, the legislature was the forum of policy, the place where whole-
sale decisions about state or national policy ought to be made.169 Like Wechsler, most of 
the Legal Process authors had been enthusiastic New Dealers in the 1930s and had sided 
with Congress (and President Roosevelt) against the federal judiciary in the run-up to the 
great Constitutional clash of 1937.170 Indeed, an “unqualified disdain for the [pre-1937] 
interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court” was a life-long guiding thesis for 
Wechsler.171 To be sure, the Legal Process authors were defenders of constitutional rights, 
                                                          
 164. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 1100. 
 165. See id. at 1102. 
 166. See MPC § 1.05 (“No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or 
another statute of this State.”). Of course, Wechsler understand that gaps and ambiguities in any code require 
judicial elaboration or interstitial legislation, and he also understood that prosecutorial interpretation of criminal 
legislation would have significant consequences. Each official actor had a part to play in the working of the 
system, and each retained some significant and appropriate discretion. Nevertheless, Wechsler saw the legislature 
as the primary–though not exclusive–body suited to make substantive criminal law and policy because it was the 
general policy-making body for the system due to its democratic legitimacy. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 
1127. 
 167. John KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMNAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (7th 
ed. 2012) (describing the Code as the “culmination of a more than century-long movement toward codification 
of the criminal law”). I add the word “predominantly” in parentheses to indicate that Wechsler understood that 
judges would still have an interstitial role to play in interpreting codified law and that, even before the Model 
Penal Code, some important criminal doctrines were already codified. 
 168. See Walker, supra note 78, at 1020 (noting that while, unlike many criminal law scholars, “[r]ather than 
decry democracy, Wechsler embraced it”). 
 169. On this account, the legislature is the forum of policy, and the judiciary is the forum of principle. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 107 
(1977). 
 170. Indeed, the Legal Process preference for legislative, as opposed to judicial, action was precisely what 
brought them into conflict with Warren Court-era legal liberals. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
LEGAL LIBERALISM 48-50 (1996) (describing what began as a “family quarrel between Warren Court activists 
and process theorists, two wings of the realist tradition”). Their expressed discomfort with Brown v. Board, 
Reynolds v. Sims, Griswold v. Connecticut and other Warren Court opinions is what ultimately left them out of 
step with their erstwhile political home on the center-left of the American political spectrum. Good New Dealers, 
the Legal Process authors found themselves increasingly at odds with post-Brown liberals—and, later, faced with 
outright hostility from the New Left of the mid-1960s and beyond. Having witnessed or directly participated in 
major statutory and regulatory schemes themselves in the 1930s and 1940s, the Legal Process authors were cau-
tiously optimistic about the capacity of democratically accountable legislatures to craft effective remedial legis-
lation in the public interest. As Wechsler was still saying in 1959, five years after Brown, “any major change [in 
law] must usually come through legislation.” Herbert Wecshler, Law, Morals, and Psychiatry, COLUM. L. SCH. 
NEWS, March 4, 1959, at 2. 
 171. Oral History, supra note 5, at 864. 
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and they endorsed judicial review of legislation, albeit of a relatively deferential kind.172 
But it was the legislature’s prerogative, on their account, to set the policy trajectory of the 
nation (or the state),173 and the judiciary should not interfere with that prerogative unless 
the legislature’s work patently violates the Constitutional scheme.174 The reason the basic 
determination of policy ought to rest with the legislature, according to the Legal Process 
approach, was that the legislature was the most democratically accountable and representa-
tive of the major organs of government.175 For Legal Process authors, questions of ends—
policy questions at the broadest levels—ought to be decided ultimately by the people’s 
preferences as expressed via the ballot box.176 
Ever sensitive to allocations of discretion, the Legal Process authors did not claim 
that the legislature had exclusive policy-making authority. They well understood that the 
volume and diversity of litigation would inevitably require courts to make significant in-
terpretations of statutorily enacted policies, interpretations that could rise to the level of 
“interstitial legislation.”177 Inheritors of the Holmesian tradition, they were comfortable 
with the court’s inevitable policymaking incursions in the course of dispute resolution.178 
Legal Process jurisprudence was also notable for its comfort with agency policymaking—
or at least, policy elucidation—within its congressionally derived allocation of discre-
tion.179 Legal Process authors, more than any other group of American jurisprudes, laid 
the intellectual foundations of the regulatory state and provided rationalizations for the 
mixture of legislative, executive, and judicial functions that agencies routinely perform in 
                                                          
 172. The first part of Neutral Principles is a defense of the legitimacy of judicial review against the arguments 
of Learned Hand in the Holmes Lecture of the previous year. See Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 2-10. 
 173. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“our penal law requires thinking through—especially upon the 
legislative level, where it is clear the basic norms must necessarily be set”); Edgar, supra note 140, at 1354 
(noting Wechsler’s “strong preference for legislative solutions” and “commitment to democratic governance”). 
 174. It was Alexander Bickel, another Legal Process author, who coined the very phrase “the counter-majori-
tarian difficulty.” ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
 175. See Peller, supra note 19, at 593 (1988) (“The idea of democracy was central . . . . Because there was 
no neutral, determinate way to evaluate substantive policy differences, they were ultimately ‘left to be made by 
count of noses at the ballot box.’”). But see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 117, at 2049-51 (criticizing Legal 
Process theory’s “thin theory of democracy”). Gary Peller’s indictment of Wechsler’s Neutral Principles article 
rested largely on the claim that Wechsler failed to appreciate the distance between the theoretical democratic 
legitimacy of the legislature and the frightful democratic defects of actual American legislatures operating in 
racially segregated societies and shot through with structural inequalities of all kinds. See Peller, supra note 19, 
at 607-15. One could, of course, make a similar criticism of Wechsler’s democracy-promoting belief in legislative 
primacy in criminal law. If state legislatures of the 1950s were incapable of providing equal protection or funda-
mental fairness to all of their citizens, regardless of race, then why should they be entrusted with the ultimate 
coercive state power, the power to criminalize and punish? 
 176. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 112 (“[D]ecisions which depend essentially on preference or sheer 
guesswork are left to made by count of noses at the ballot box.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 238 (1948) (discussing “that subordinate and interstitial legislation which must come 
in any system from the courts”); see also Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 524 (“I think a penal code must 
confer large discretion on the courts and other organs of administration, at the same time that it seeks to guide 
the exercise the discretion so conferred.”). 
 178. Indeed, the Legal Process approach to statutory interpretation might best be characterized as an attempt 
to orchestrate an effective collaboration between the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive branch toward 
the achievement of society’s chosen policy goals. 
 179. Keith Werhen, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 576-80 (1992). 
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apparent tension with Constitutional separation of powers principles.180 The Legal Process 
authors were thus not crude or formalistic in allocating policymaking authority; rather, 
they cast the legislature as the pre-eminent policymaking forum in a complex legal order 
(process) in which other actors and institutions had their own legitimate policymaking 
discretion. This was precisely the attitude Wechsler brought to the Model Penal Code pro-
ject: lodge pre-eminent policymaking authority in the most democratically accountable 
branch, the legislature, via a clear and comprehensive Code, but also pay close attention 
to arranging residual discretion appropriately throughout the criminal justice system.181 
There is, of course, some apparent tension between a commitment to democratic 
decisionmaking and the American Law Institute’s elite, professional drafting process. The 
Advisory Committee that Wechsler assembled—professionally more diverse than it might 
have been—was hardly a cross-section of the American people. Nor did Wechsler ever 
believe that criminal law doctrine ought to be determined by a simple “count of noses at 
the ballot box.”182 The Model Penal Code project was, in conception and in execution, an 
undertaking by legal elites (elite practitioners and elite academics) to influence legislative 
criminal reform along the lines that they, the elites, thought best.183 But to influence is not 
to dictate, and Wechsler was clear that “it is not our purpose to propose or to promote the 
uniformity of law throughout the country.”184 Hence, a model penal code, not a uniform 
one. Wechsler insisted that the purpose of such a model was to “formulate in statutory 
form a draft that may be useful as a model.”185 Of course, the idea was that a “systematic 
re-examination” of criminal law by legal and other professional experts relatively immune 
from immediate political pressure would yield a model representing “the mature sentiment 
of our respective jurisdictions” and “a reasoned, integrated body of material that will be 
useful in such legislative effort, as a solid treatise on a legal subject often aids adjudication 
by the courts.”186 Wechsler wanted to provide a highly polished model code reflecting the 
most up-to-date professional knowledge and the consensus preferences of elite profession-
als, where consensus existed. “Having assumed the discipline of drafting,” wrote 
                                                          
 180. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmod-
ern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 710 (1991) (“Legal process transformed public law discourse, legiti-
mating the modern regulatory state without sacrificing its flexibility in a dynamic world.”). The Legal Process 
obsession with the allocation of discretion was, in short, an attempt to update classic separation of powers prin-
ciples for the post-War regulatory state. 
 181. See, e.g., Some Observations, supra note 28, at 394 (“The framework that I have described is offered as 
a means to the sound distribution of responsibility and function among legislature, courts[,] and organs of cor-
rection, taking account of the judgments each is best equipped to make, given the time when it must act, the 
nature of its action, the type of information that it has available for judgment[,] and the dangers of unfairness or 
abuse.”). 
 182. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 112. 
 183. Geoffrey Hazard, Tribute in Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1362, 1363 (2000). In a 
posthumous tribute, Hazard wrote that Wechsler was “both intellectually aristocratic and profoundly democratic” 
in his attitude toward law. 
 184. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525. The Model Penal Code ambition was thus importantly different 
than that of the American Law Institute’s Uniform Commercial Code, the first edition of which was published in 
1952, just as the Model Penal Code project began. As its title indicates, the Uniform Commercial Code project 
had as its conscious goal the promotion of uniformity in commercial law throughout the country. See Some Ob-
servations, supra note 28, at 321 (distinguishing the value of uniformity for commercial as opposed to criminal 
law). 
  185.  Some Observations, supra note 28, at 321. 
  186. Id. 
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Wechsler, “we are not without ambition that our models will seem worthy of adoption or 
at least of adaptation.”187 The code would not shirk from taking positions on many of the 
major issues of criminal code drafting, and those positions would no doubt generally re-
flect the “mature sentiment” of the elite criminal bar, the judiciary, and the professori-
ate.188 
At the same time, Wechsler recognized that some questions touched upon differ-
ent prioritizations of values that no professional competence could determine in the ab-
stract. Wechsler, who appreciated the benefits of a federal system, also fully expected that 
different states with different constituencies facing different social conditions might 
choose to resolve value clashes in different ways. In short, Wechsler recognized both value 
pluralism and regional variation and therefore expected different jurisdictions to make dif-
ferent value choices through the democratic, legislative process.189 Wechsler also hoped 
that the Model Penal Code project would be beneficial even for those who disagreed with 
the ultimate value choices and doctrinal choices made by the drafters. “[E]ven though the 
formulations we have drawn prove unpersuasive,” he wrote, “others may be aided to their 
own conclusions by our attempt to state the issues and to canvas the considerations that a 
legislative judgment ought to weigh.”190 The commentaries of the Code were, by design, 
detailed discussions of the dilemmas raised by each provision, the benefits and demerits 
of various possible resolutions, and explanations for why the American Law Institute 
chose the resolution it did.191 The key mission was to gather relevant information and to 
articulate the most persuasive viewpoints all in one accessible and systematically arranged 
form, so as to create a spur and resource for legislators to reform their state’s criminal 
laws.192 It was thus the concept of a model code—neither a restatement of judge-made 
                                                          
 187. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, supra note 156, at 467. 
 188. Some Observations, supra note 28, at 321; Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“[W]e mean to act as 
if we were a legislative commission, charged with construction of an ideal penal code—properly regardful of 
realities but free, as legislative commissions rarely are, to take account of long range values as distinguished 
from immediate political demands.”). 
 189. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525. (“We are not animated by the thought—presumptuous as it would 
be—that our resolution of competing values of the kind reflected in the penal law should command general 
adherence, given the variety of circumstance and point of view in different states throughout the Union.”). De-
scribing the work of the drafters, Wechsler declared clearly: “we do not seek to standardize the law of crimes.” 
Id. In Wechsler’s view, it fell ultimately to legislatures representing the people of their states—and not to judges 
or to expert panels—to make the value choices required by criminal codification. Markus Dubber has written 
that the “Model Penal Code was meant to emerge unmoored from any historical foundation, American or state-
specific; as a document of scientific progress it is universally applicable, and adaptable—if necessary—to its 
specific audience.” Alegitimacy, supra note 4, at 241. Insofar as he is suggesting that the ambition of the Model 
Penal Code was to universalize its particular resolution of dilemmas raised by criminal law, I think Wechsler 
would reject that characterization of the project. Wechsler’s hope, of course, was to spur comprehensive penal 
reform in all American jurisdictions and to influence the outcome of that reform. But the Code project had no 
ambitions beyond the American context and, even there, Wechsler recognized that different jurisdictions might 
reasonably choose different formulations. 
 190. Some Observations, supra note 28, at 323; accord Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“We hope that 
those who disagree with our conclusions will be aided in their own appraisal of the answers by the data and 
analysis that we advance.”). It is notable how this attitude echoes the methodology of the Rationale article, in 
which he and Michael emphasized laying out the important “considerations” related to homicide law, rather than 
resolving them. Rationale I, supra note 71, at 702. The Model Penal Code took the methodology of Rationale, 
expanded it to the whole universe of criminal law and punishment, and then added a model code resolving im-
portant questions in the way Wechsler and his fellow drafters preferred. 
 191. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1130 (“The hope is to produce a commentary that will help to place the 
systematic literature of our penal law upon a parity with that of well-developed legal fields.”). 
 192. See Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“We urge no more than that the issues should be seen and 
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law, nor a uniform code, but a useful model with accompanying commentaries—that, for 
Wechsler, resolved the tension between his commitment to democratic decisionmaking 
and his leadership of a thoroughly elite legislative drafting project ordained by the self-
selected legal experts of the American Law Institute.193 
 
C. The Code’s Purposes and Value Pluralism 
 
Legal Process was not the first school of jurisprudence to emphasize the purpos-
ive nature of law; its embrace of “law as a means to an end” was consistent with a vener-
able tradition of American jurisprudence going back at least to Holmes, Pound, and of 
course, the Legal Realists.194 In the first line of their preface to the 1958 Tentative Edition 
of the Legal Process materials, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks explained that “[t]hese mate-
rials are concerned with the study of law as an ongoing, functioning, purposive pro-
cess.”195 The important point is that Legal Process theory, in its most philosophical elab-
oration, rested profoundly on a purposive philosophy of law. Hart and Sacks pitched the 
ultimate purposes of law at a very high level of abstraction, but the Legal Process authors 
did not venerate legal process for its own sake.196 Nor did they believe that the realm of 
process, as opposed to substance, was somehow value-free or neutral or apolitical.197 Ra-
ther, they believed that legal processes—the legal system as well as particular fields—
                                                          
should be faced.”); see also Challenge, supra note 22, at 1130 (“The object is to canvass the existing law and 
practice, articulating legislative issues, analyzing possible solutions[,] and appraising the competing values and 
considerations which a legislative choice should weigh.”) The criticism that Wechsler was convinced that he had 
worked out in the Model Penal Code the scientifically correct answers to the venerable dilemmas of criminal law 
strikes me as entirely off target. Of course, like all good lawyers and academics, Wechsler made cogent argu-
ments in favor of his preferred resolution of contested issues, and he hoped his arguments would be persuasive 
and influential. But the charge of hubris—the idea that Wechsler had excessive self-confidence or undue certainty 
in his own rightness—misses both his value pluralism and his distrust of social science as a basis for resolving 
legal-policy questions. As Wechsler himself wrote, the point of the Model Penal Code project was not to freeze, 
but to unfreeze, thinking about criminal law. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1133. 
 193. See Some Observations, supra note 28, at 321 (“By ‘model,’ . . . we mean nothing more than formulations 
that may be suggestive and commend themselves to legislative imitation . . . .”). Wechsler later credited the “con-
ception of the ‘model’” as part of the explanation for the Code’s success. Oral History, supra note 5, at 919. “We 
never over-pressed the position. . . . We proposed it modestly as a source, and I think that its success is some 
indication of the rhetorical effectiveness of understatement in this world, as against overstatement.” Id. 
Markus Dubber has argued that the Code, as a model, could just as well have been prepared for enactment by an 
enlightened tyrant as for a democratic legislature. Alegitimacy, supra note 4, at 246 (“As an agnostic manual for 
the suppression of crime, the Model Penal Code would have been as useful to a sophisticated—and perhaps even 
benevolent—prince . . . as to Wechsler’s intended audience [of American legislatures].”) Here again, I think 
Wechsler would have rejected Dubber’s contention insofar as he is suggesting that Wechsler cared little for the 
democratic legitimacy of enacted criminal law. Wechsler would have reiterated his view that the model code was 
meant to assist democratic legislators in fulfilling their responsibility as representatives of the people in making 
the value choices necessary to enact a code. 
 194. BRIAN TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006). Some might 
locate the instrumentalism of American law to even earlier antecedents, e.g., nineteenth century judges. See, e.g., 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 7-30 (1977); William E. Nelson, 
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 513 (1977). 
 195. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at cxxxvii (emphases added). 
 196. According to Hart & Sacks, the legal system aimed at “three main objectives”: (1) the maintenance of 
basic social order (as opposed to disintegration into violence and chaos); (2) the maximization of the total satis-
factions of valid human wants; and (3) a fair division of the good things of life. Id. at 104. 
 197. Barzun, supra note 10, at 32 (“One of the most pervasive and pernicious misconceptions about the Legal 
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should be evaluated according to how well they achieve the purposes for which they were 
created. Charles Barzun has suggested that we interpret the word “process” in the title of 
the Legal Process materials to be “the process of ‘interaction of means and end,’ of fact 
and value, of ethics and science, by which a society fulfills its purposes.”198 In other 
words, the focus on process was not meant to displace discussion of substantive ends or to 
promote dry proceduralism; the focus on process was there to evaluate the fit of means 
and ends in any area of law. Wechsler had already identified “the ordering of means and 
ends” as the core task of legal reform before the War.199 In the Model Penal Code as 
elsewhere in his writings on criminal law, Wechsler endeavored to articulate as precisely 
as possible the ends—the values—that the criminal law was meant to promote. 
Much has been written about the theory of punishment embedded in the Model 
Penal Code, and much has been made of the document’s utilitarian commitments.200 There 
is no doubt that Wechsler saw deterrence as the most convincing rationale for a regime of 
criminal punishment. He also had some sympathy for the rehabilitative ideal, though much 
less than may be supposed from the Code’s use of the term “treatment” in lieu of punish-
ment.201 It is also true that the language of the Model Penal Code largely, though not 
entirely, eschewed the rhetoric of retributivism, a theory then at the nadir of its scholarly 
prestige. It would be a mistake, however, to see the Model Penal Code as the product of a 
strictly utilitarian or deterrence-based mindset.202 Retributive values were both explicit in 
the text, in the Commentaries, and in Wechsler’s writings about the Code. Wechsler was 
clear that, in his view, criminal conviction is at its essence a moral condemnation of the 
defendant. “[I]t is the penal law,” he wrote, “that safeguards our deepest human interests 
at the same that it governs condemnation and disgrace and punishment, with all the suf-
fering that they entail and their irreparable scars.”203 Precisely for that reason, it was im-
portant to draft a code of criminal law that condemned only those deserving of such moral 
censure.204 The Code’s own Purposes section contained a mix of retributive, deterrent 
                                                          
Process materials is that the theory there offered was understood by the editors to ‘neutral’ with respect to con-
troversial underlying values.”). 
  198. Id. at 43. 
 199. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 6. 
 200. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back With a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Pur-
pose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313 (2000) (discussing the utilitarian aspects of the Model 
Penal Code). 
 201. Rationale II, supra note 71, at 1318-25 (discussing Michael & Wechsler’s views of reformation as a 
primary rationale of punishment). 
 202. The statement that “[i]n substance, the Model Code implemented a simple consequential model: prevent 
crime through deterrence and, if deterrence fails, through ‘treatment and correction’” is precisely the view of the 
Model Penal Code against which I am arguing. Dubber, Penal Panopticon, supra note 4, at 53. Wechsler, for 
instance, wholeheartedly rejected the idea that a mere showing of future dangerousness could form the basis of 
criminal conviction. Herbert Wechsler, Insanity As A Defense: A Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 398 
(1965) (“[I]f you’re going to rebuild the law of the United States so that a fellow can be convicted of a crime 
because he’s accident prone, I’m going to move to Australia, and I think you’ll join me there after a little while.”). 
 203. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 528 (“Crime means condemnation and it is not right to pass that 
judgement [sic] if the bench can not declare that the defendant’s act was wrong. This is a point that lawyers can 
not compromise.”). These passages are incompatible with a view that Wechsler’s retributivism was merely an 
accommodation to popular feelings. But it is certainly true that Wechsler’s commitment to democracy—and his 
belief that criminal laws must be in general accord with social norms to be effective—also factored into his 
cautious embrace of retribution. See generally Walker, supra note 78 (discussing Wechsler’s retributive views). 
 204. This was a view Wechsler shared with Henry Hart, as evidenced by Hart’s own significant contribution 
to criminal law scholarship. See Henry Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 412 
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(general and specific), rehabilitative, and incapacitative purposes.205 The sentencing pro-
visions, for instance, allowed judges to impose longer sentences of imprisonment on a 
determination that “a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant’s 
crime.”206 As its widespread acceptance and endurance also suggest, this was not a Code 
committed to any single theory of punishment to the exclusion of others.207 
Crucially, Wechsler and Hart both understood the aims of the criminal law as 
irreducibly plural. Henry Hart began his article The Aims of the Criminal Law with a stir-
ring paean to value pluralism in criminal law. 
 
A penal code that reflected only a single basic principle would be a very 
bad one. Social purposes can never be single or simple, or held unquali-
fiedly to the exclusion of all other social purposes; and an effort to make 
them so can result only in the sacrifice of other values which also are 
important. Thus, to take only one example, the purpose of preventing any 
particular kind of crime, or crimes generally, is qualified always by the 
purposes of avoiding conviction of the innocent and of enhancing that 
sense of security throughout the society which is one of the prime func-
tions of the manifold safeguards of American criminal procedure. And 
the same thing would be true even if the dominant purpose of the crimi-
nal law were thought to be the rehabilitation of offenders rather than the 
prevention of offenses. . . . The problem, accordingly, is one of the pri-
ority and relationship of purposes as well of their legitimacy—of multi-
valued rather than of single-valued thinking.208 
 
                                                          
(1958). A crime, according to Hart, is “conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and 
solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.” Id. at 405. And the only thing that “dis-
tinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies 
and justifies its imposition.” Id. at 404; cf. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“[I]t is the penal law that 
safeguards our deepest human interests at the same that it governs condemnation and disgrace and punishment, 
with all the suffering that they entail and their irreparable scars.”). 
 205. Note, for instance, the self-admitted futility of Markus Dubber’s attempt to identify the punishment the-
ories implicit in the Code’s Purposes section. See DUBBER, supra note 4, at 24-26. 
 206. MPC § 7.01. See also Wechsler, supra note 202, at 406 (“You see, my approach to the thing is not in 
terms of maximum public safety, it really is in terms of developing a system that seeks to do justice and maintain 
the sense of public freedom that I think so vital to a good society.”). 
 207. Gerard Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 222 (2003). 
Lynch made much the same point in noting that “the core provisions of the Code stand up remarkably well despite 
the resurgence of retributivism or just deserts thinking. If anything, indeed, they have solidified. . . . [T]he general 
part of the Code Wechsler produced is quite consistent with Kantian notions of fairness and desert.” 
 208. Hart, supra note 204, at 401. That article, which Hart claimed was a “revision of a mimeographed note 
originally prepared for first-year law students,” was published during the drafting of the Model Penal Code. Id. 
Though the full tentative draft of the Code was still incomplete and years away from adoption, numerous partial 
drafts had already been released, making the overall tenor and many particular formulations of the Code public. 
The Aims of the Criminal Law thus constituted Hart’s major comment on the Model Penal Code project, with 
perhaps some hope that he might influence its final form and its reception upon completion. Hart’s article was 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Project, the drafts he had studied, and the project’s underlying philosophy. Id. 
at passim. There is no overt criticism of his friend and one-time co-author Wechsler, and one might speculate 
that he and Wechsler had spoken privately about the Code project and probably also about this article. 
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Not coincidentally, the only citation Hart offers for this line of thought is 
Wechsler and Michael’s Rationale II.209 Wechsler was already sounding pluralist themes 
in the 1930s, and the Model Penal Code project only amplified them. As Wechsler put it 
in 1961 near the completion of the project, “The Code is drafted with the view that here, 
as elsewhere in the realm of law and government, wisdom is unlikely to inhere in action 
guided by a single value when a multiplicity of values is involved.” 210 Instead, he went 
on, “[t]he course of prudence normally is to shape policy in terms that take account of the 
diversity of interest, ordering[,] and harmonizing in so far as possible the conflicts that 
emerge.”211 Wechsler’s value pluralism, shared with Hart and other Legal Process authors, 
meant that drafting a criminal code could not be a mere technocratic exercise.212 Wechsler 
was explicit that the drafters would face “competing values” openly, consider them, and 
explain their choices as best they could.213 Wechsler had no illusions that the Code would 
be a value-free or neutral document and well understood that reasonable people and rea-
sonable legislators might disagree about the value choices he and the ALI made;214 hence, 
his insistence that uniformity was not a goal of the project and that the commentaries serve 
as a resource for further debate on contestable subjects.215 The success of the Code—its 
unprecedented influence on state reform efforts, its prominence in criminal law pedagogy 
and scholarship, and its endurance for over 50 years—would not have been possible with-
out the explicit inclusion of multiple ends in the Code’s provisions and Wechsler’s humil-
ity regarding the value choices made by the drafters.216 
 
D. Pragmatism, Prudence, and Principle 
 
Rather than trying to pigeon-hole the Code’s philosophy into one or two of the 
conventional theories of punishment, we would do better to see its broadly consequentialist 
bent as part of the general Legal Process’s purposive and pragmatic approach to law. For 
the Legal Process School certainly looked at all law—both “public” and “private” law—
                                                          
 209. Id. at 401 n.2. In his memorial tribute to Wechsler, Geoffrey Hazard noted Wechsler’s “[a]ppreciation of 
the normative pluralism” as one of the key virtues he brought to the study of American federalism. Hazard, supra 
note 183, at 1367. 
 210. Wechsler, supra note 156, at 468; see also Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 18 (“I 
doubt . . . that there is another legal field which presents sharper conflicts with respect to basic values [than 
criminal law].”). 
 211. Wechsler, supra note 156, at 468. For more on Wechsler’s prudence, see discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 212. Wechsler wrote, “It is vital . . . that we should bring to bear on the full body of the law of crime whatever 
knowledge, statesmanship, morality[,] and effort we are able to command.” Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 
525 (emphasis added). 
 213. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1130 (“The object is to canvass the existing law and practice, articulating 
legislative issues, analyzing possible solutions[,] and appraising the competing values and considerations which 
a legislative choice should weigh.”); accord Hart, supra note 204, at 402 (“A complex of institutional ends must 
be served . . . as well as complex of substantive social ends.”). 
 214. See Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 525 (“We are not animated by the thought—presumptuous as it 
would be—that our resolution of competing values of the kind reflected in the penal law should command general 
adherence, given the variety of circumstance and point of view in different states throughout the Union.”). 
 215. See Some Observations, supra note 28, at 323 (“[E]ven though the formulations we have drawn prove 
unpersuasive, others may be aided to their own conclusions by our attempt to state the issues and to canvas the 
considerations that a legislative judgment ought to weigh.”). 
 216. Oral History, supra note 5, at 919 (noting “the rhetorical effectiveness of understatement in this world, 
as against overstatement”). 
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as a technique of good governance, a constructed set of processes aimed at achieving social 
ends.217 For both Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, the legal apparatus of the criminal 
justice system was the backstop set of official procedures aimed at identifying and mini-
mizing the most harmful, anti-social behaviors.218 Criminal law, on this account, is not 
the function of any freestanding theory of punishment or of private ethics; it is a mode of 
governance and must be justified and assessed as any other public policy would be: Are 
its social ends legitimate, and are its means the best available to achieve its ends?219 These 
questions are much more open-ended than a simple utilitarian (or other monist) assessment 
of criminal law would be.220 They also eschew a more private, moralistic perspective on 
criminal law, one that might see the drafting of a penal code as an exercise in applied moral 
philosophy. Ethics are involved in the legal process, of course—but more the Weberian 
ethic of responsibility than the ethic of moral conviction.221 “[T]he penal law should not 
be used merely to express the pious sentiment of the community,” wrote Wechsler.222 
                                                          
 217. See Edgar, supra note 140, at 1349 (2000) (describing Wechsler’s view of law as “a means of governance 
in which essentially political choices constantly are made and must be made, and therefore should be made in 
conscious pursuit of sensible social policy”); see also Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming 
Criminal Law in a Time of Shifting Rationales of Government, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 247 n.4 (2003). One 
of the key Realist insights was that the so-called private law was itself a public mode of governance, that its 
judge-made rules reflected policy choices as much as any piece of legislation or regulatory provision, and that 
these policy choices should be faced transparently. It was that much easier for Realists and post-Realists in the 
Legal Process School to see criminal law, always categorized as public law even when its provisions were pri-
marily judge-made, as a domain of public policy, not simply a realm of private or inter-personal justice. See, e.g., 
Leonard, supra note 38, at 809 (2003) (“Realism called for frankness in the setting of policy goals and a recog-
nition that law is not some autonomous science but simply a tool for reaching those goals. It thus supported 
reformers’ unanimous view that criminal law was merely a means of crime control.”); cf. Louis M. Seidman, 
Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 97, 99-115 (1996) (arguing that Wechsler and the Model Penal Code project, among others, failed 
to fully incorporate Realist insights into the criminal law). 
 218. See Challenge, supra note 22, at 1098 (“This [criminal law] is the law on which men place their ultimate 
reliance for protection against all the deepest injuries that human conflict can inflict on individuals and institu-
tions.”); Hart, supra note 204, at 410 (“For it is the criminal law which defines the minimum conditions of man’s 
responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility.”). 
 219. In distinguishing between a private justice orientation and a public policy orientation in thinking about 
criminal law, I am drawing on Gerald Leonard’s powerful article Towards a Legal History of American Criminal 
Theory. See Leonard, supra note 38. In that article, Leonard developed a dichotomy between two visions of 
criminal law: a “‘private’ version of criminal law focused on justice to the accused and, on the other hand, a 
‘public’ version, derived in part from the historical designation of criminal law as a branch of public law, focusing 
on public policy and social consequences.” Id. at 827. Leonard’s dichotomy matches up in some ways with 
Herbert Packer’s two models—crime control (public) and due process (private)—but is even broader. Leonard 
himself seemed to view the Model Penal Code as a “sort of synthesis (by brute force, perhaps)” of the public and 
private versions of criminal law. Id. at 822. My view is that the public version dominates the Model Penal Code. 
 220. Importantly, these questions begin with an interest in the social practices of criminal law as they actually 
exist and then subject those practices to critique, rather than starting with a grand social philosophy and then 
demanding that the social practices of the criminal law conform to the theory. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 
14, at 111 (“The beginning of wisdom for the social scientist . . . is to seek an understanding of the relevant 
aspects of the institutional system within which the subject of his inquiry is located.”). 
 221. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 118-19 (H.H. Gerth 
& C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). I do not wish to get into deep interpretive debates about Weber’s distinc-
tion between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of moral conviction (or the ethic of ultimate ends). What I 
intend to note here is a distinction between (1) a public and prudential ethics concerned with achieving the best 
possible social outcomes and (2) a private and principled ethics concerned with consistency and personal recti-
tude. For Hart and Wechsler, as for Weber, the crafting of public policy calls upon the former more than the 
latter. 
 222. Codification of Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 1432. 
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Henry Hart made this pragmatic view even more explicit when he urged readers 
to “picture[] the criminal law as a process, a way of doing something, which is what it 
is.”223 “[T]he criminal law,” Hart wrote, “like all law, is concerned with the pursuit of 
human purposes through the forms and modes of social organization, and it needs always 
to be thought about in that context as a method or process of doing something.”224 The 
point of thinking about criminal law, according to this view, is not to create a beautiful 
intellectual construct of ideal postulates; the point is to do something, to change a complex 
social practice, to make it “work” better, to better align means and ends. The Model Penal 
Code project, as conceived by Wechsler, was nothing if not pragmatic in that basic 
sense.225 It is this pragmatic social fixation—more than any commitment to deterrence or 
rehabilitation—that accounts for the general hostility of the Code to thoroughgoing Kant-
ian retributivism. Wechsler, the Legal Process author, was simply not an idealist about 
criminal law; he did not believe that criminal doctrine needed to be in perfect accord with 
any abstract ethical imperative. He understood criminal law as a complex set of public 
practices with multiple values at stake, and the task was to try to balance among multiple 
values keeping in mind the actual embeddedness of the substantive rules in institutions of 
limited capacities. For Wechsler, it was not that the law should ignore ideals; it was that 
there are multiple ideals, not all of which can be practically realized; legal reform requires 
hard choices among ideals while keeping in mind the actual (limited) competencies of the 
official actors and institutions through which the law operates. 
Understanding law as a field of action, of purposive processes, Wechsler’s ap-
proach to drafting the Code emphasized practical wisdom, or prudence, above all. The task 
was, after all, to improve the social practices of the criminal law, not to flaunt one’s moral 
righteousness or to gain knowledge for knowledge’s sake.226 This is not to say that 
Wechsler deprecated scholastic projects; indeed, he saw the Model Penal Code itself as a 
scholastic project. Rather, the Jamesian pragmatism of the Legal Process approach held 
that “the ultimate purpose of thought is to help in deciding upon a course of action.”227 In 
that sense, Wechsler’s explicit legislative reform work was not, in his mind, categorically 
                                                          
 223. Hart, supra note 204, at 402. 
 224. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). One may not, of course, simply ascribe Hart’s views to Wechsler. Dubber, 
for one, sees some daylight between the two when it came to their conception of criminal law as law. See Alegit-
imacy, supra note 4, at 258. But I can find very little suggesting a significant rift between Hart and Wechsler 
regarding the Model Penal Code project or their views on substantive criminal law more generally. The evidence 
of their jurisprudential collaboration during the period when Hart wrote and published The Aims of the Criminal 
Law is significant, most importantly Wechsler’s year-long visitation at Harvard during which he and Hart (al-
ready co-authors of the Federal Courts casebook) attended the Legal Philosophy Reading group together. Hart’s 
suggested revision of the Code’s Purposes provisions are interesting, see id. at 440-41, but actually show how 
friendly Hart’s attitude toward the Code approach was. I see those suggestions as Hart’s attempt to better articu-
late the connection between the Code and Legal Process theory’s philosophical foundations. 
 225. See Barzun, supra note 10, at 36-41 (emphasizing the influence of philosophical American Pragmatism 
on Henry Hart and the Legal Process more generally). 
 226. Prudence in the sense I am using it here—practical wisdom about ends and means with respect to specific 
actions or deliberations—is usually contrasted with sophia or theoretical wisdom about universals and necessary 
truths. I use the terms prudence, practical wisdom, and phronesis interchangeably in this article. 
 227. Hart, supra note 204, at 402. See also Barzun, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that Hart and Sacks, in a chain 
of influence going back through Lon Fuller to William James, believed that “all knowledge, including that de-
rived from the social and even natural sciences, was, in a sense, craft knowledge—that is, knowledge of how to 
do something.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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distinct from his scholarly agenda; they were one and the same.228 Practical wisdom, for 
Wechsler, was thus not a virtue of the legal practitioner alone, but also of the legal aca-
demic and legal reformer, of anyone interested in the “basic and intrinsic problems of the 
field, the questions as to ends and means that ought to be confronted in the building or 
appraisal or improvement of a system geared to serve its proper functions in the govern-
ment of men.”229 
There are important debates in the philosophical literature about what exactly 
prudence means, but what I mean to pick out here is a set of intellectual dispositions related 
to thinking practically about specific choices and actions rather than thinking in purely 
abstract or theoretical terms. Among the traits typically associated with prudence are: a 
disposition toward the practically achievable rather than the ideal;230 thinking in particu-
lars rather than universals; recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge and power; sensitiv-
ity to complexity in human nature and human institutions;231 and reliance on experience 
and commonsense intuition in addition to formalized knowledge or decisional criteria.232 
Though Wechsler himself never wrote explicitly philosophical studies of the classical tra-
dition of prudence (phronesis)—or of American Pragmatism for that matter—his outlook 
and that of his Legal Process cohort was thoroughly prudential.233 
The prudentialism of Legal Process thinking, though not unremarked, is often 
passed over in commentators’ emphasis on the Legal Process devotion to reasoned elabo-
ration or “neutral principles.”234 For instance, in his book on American legal theory, Neil 
                                                          
 228. In a short lecture he delivered at a 1955 Conference on [the] Aims and Methods of Legal Research, 
Wechsler wrote that “penal law offers a many-sided challenge to ‘research’—by which I mean and hope you 
mean no more than systematic inquiry designed to gain ideas, insights or information relevant to the solution of 
important problems of the field.” Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 18 (printing Wechsler’s 
speech delivered at the University of Michigan on Nov. 5, 1955). The Code also advanced Wechsler’s pedagog-
ical agenda. Markus Dubber remarked that “the Code reads—and looks—as much like a criminal law textbook 
as it does like a Code. It was meant to teach criminal law to criminal justice professionals.” DUBBER, supra note 
4, at 10. Wechsler’s pragmatic understanding of legal scholarship also made him somewhat scornful, perhaps 
unduly so, of purely critical projects: “[A]n activity can not be ‘wrong,’ no less ‘completely wrong,’ unless and 
until some more promising alternative has been devised.” Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, 
at 21-22. 
 229. Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 20; accord Albert Sacks, Henry Hart, 82 HARV. 
L. REV. 1593 (1969) (“Since [Hart] conceived of law as a process of doing, he drew no distinction between 
understanding law and developing law. To understand law was to develop it. To develop law intelligently was to 
understand it. The law scholar and the law doer were one.”). 
 230. Cf. Barzun, supra note 10, at 40 (“[Lon] Fuller’s point was not just that it was difficult or even impossible 
to separate questions of ends from means, but that it was affirmatively better to conceptualize ends in light of the 
means available.”). 
 231. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 111 (“The beginning of wisdom for the social scientist . . . is to 
seek an understanding of the relevant aspects of the institutional system within which the subject of his inquiry 
is located. He needs to know . . .both the presently fixed limitations of the system and its existing leeways.”). 
 232. See id. (arguing that, in understanding society, “science must depend ultimately upon judgment—upon 
judgment informed by experience and by all the objective data that can feasibly be assembled, but upon judgment 
nevertheless”). 
 233. This discussion relies significantly on Anthony Kronman’s description of prudence in describing another 
Legal Process author, Alexander Bickel. See Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 
YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (discussing Bickel’s ideas on law and politics); see also Anthony Kronman, Practical 
Wisdom & Professional Character, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 203, 206-07 (1986) (discussing the idea of “phrone-
sis,”—or “prudence”—as a practical way of thinking about the law). 
   234.  DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 276 (discussing Wechsler’s view of why courts should strive to abide by 
neutral principles, even though neutral principles do not always lead to correct results). 
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Duxbury titled the chapter dedicated to the Legal Process School “Finding Faith in Rea-
son” and argued that the Legal Process development of the concept of “principle” was a 
key theme in the veneration of “reason.”235 There is good reason why many discussions 
of Legal Process theory take “reasoned elaboration” and “neutral principles” as the central 
contributions of Legal Process theory. It is because those two phrases have come to repre-
sent the Legal Process approach to adjudication, and American legal academics tend to 
focus on theories of adjudication in jurisprudential discussions. The Legal Process authors 
themselves, however, were notable for their interest in the entire system of legal pro-
cesses—including legislation, administration, regulation, private ordering, even constitu-
tion-making—and the full spectrum of officials and institutions comprising that system. If 
the large-scale organization of the Hart & Sacks’ Legal Process materials encapsulated 
one message, it was that adjudication—the work of judges—was only one prism through 
which to view the law. So while reasoned elaboration and principled decisionmaking may 
have been the touchstones of Legal Process thought regarding adjudication (at least in 
appellate courts), those concepts did not cover the field of Legal Process jurisprudence. 
Rather, the Legal Process—and Wechsler’s own—focus on comparative institutional com-
petence was premised on the idea that different institutions in the legal system have dif-
ferent capacities and appropriate methodologies for decisionmaking.236 The court may be 
a forum of principle, but the legislature is a forum of policy. Consequently, there was no 
direct contradiction in demanding strict fidelity to principle and reasoned elaboration from 
judges but also promoting prudent and even expedient public policymaking by legisla-
tures.237 
There was still, however, some significant tension between Wechlser’s pruden-
tialism and the ambition of the Model Penal Code to “provide a reasoned, integrated body 
of material.”238 One of the chief aims of the Code—and by many accounts, one of its 
greatest achievements—was its coherence, its systematic ordering of the hitherto scattered 
and haphazard doctrines of criminal law.239 Markus Dubber’s comment that “[i]n a sense, 
the Model Penal Code’s structure is the Model Penal Code” is accurate.240 As he put it, 
“[t]he Code wears its conceptual coherence on its sleeve” and “[t]he Model Code drafters 
imposed structure on chaos wherever they turned.”241 Its coherence is manifested in the 
Code’s large-scale organization, in the careful definition and consistent use of terms, and 
in the strict consistency of the “special part” defining specific offenses with the “general 
part” provisions setting out general principles of liability. The intellectual roots of the 
Code’s systematicity cannot all be traced back to Legal Process jurisprudence, for surely 
                                                          
 235. Id. at 297 (“The [Legal Process] tradition must be understood primarily as the embodiment of an attitude 
concerning the importance of rationality within a democracy.”). Duxbury’s chapter on Legal Process also con-
tains a sub-section primarily on Alexander Bickel titled “The Jurisprudence of Prudence.” Id. at 278-86. 
 236. But see Anthony J. Sebok, Reading the Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1594 (1996) (arguing that 
Hart & Sacks end up demanding the same rigorous criteria of decisionmaking from all legal decisionmakers, not 
only judges, and thereby accidentally brought administrative decisions into disrepute). 
 237. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 174, at 58 (1986) (“[I]t is for legislatures, not courts, to impose what are 
merely solutions of expediency. Courts must act on true principles, capable of unremitting application.”). 
  238. Some Observations, supra note 28, at 321. 
 239. Hazard, supra note 183, at 1362-63 (“The approach manifested in the MPC was to establish analytic 
coherence for the terms in which the received law should speak . . . . He sought coherence . . . .”). 
  240. DUBBER, supra note 4, at 17. 
 241. Id. 
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the impulse toward coherence in legal reform (in law generally) is more venerable and 
pervasive than any post-War school of thought. But Legal Process theory’s interest in rea-
son—in the “reason immanent in law”242—was real, and Wechsler’s own interest in prin-
cipled decisionmaking famously extended beyond his work on criminal law to Constitu-
tional adjudication.243 Moreover, Wechsler repeatedly invoked terms such as 
“rational,”244 “systematic,”245 and “reasoned”246 when describing the Code’s “rethink-
ing” of criminal doctrine.247 These terms suggest that the rationalization project Wechsler 
had in mind for criminal law went beyond the attempt to match doctrinal means and policy 
ends; it was also an attempt to make the law more integral, more consistent with itself, 
such that principles adopted in one area of the law would be applied mutatis mutandis in 
other areas as well.248 
Where adherence to principle or a strict consistency would lead to imprudent 
choices, tension is inevitable. To be sure, prudential thinking is not the same as unprinci-
pled thinking; the prudentialist may be as deeply committed to principles and ideals as a 
typical idealist. As Anthony Kronman articulated it, “a prudent person . . . is one who sees 
complexities, who has an eye for what Bickel called the ‘unruliness of the human condi-
tion,’ but is nevertheless able to devise successful strategies for the advancement (however 
gradual or slow) of his own favored principles and ideals.”249 It is not accurate then to say 
that prudence and principle are contradictory, and the prudential reformer will in fact suc-
ceed in advancing his principles better than an imprudent one. But in the accommodations 
that a prudential reformer must accept, purity of principle inevitably suffers.250 Thus, in 
                                                          
 242. DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 205-06. In his invocation of neutral principles, Wechsler never suggested 
that legal decisionmakers could eschew substantive value choices. To the contrary, he explicitly noted that such 
value choices are occasionally necessary. See Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 15. Wechsler’s demand was 
that a judge ought not choose among principles solely to reach the judge’s preferred result in the case at hand, 
but ought to choose the principle which he or she would be willing to apply across the full domain of relevant 
cases. Id. at 17, 19. It might have been better had Wechsler titled the article “Toward the Articulation and Neutral 
Application of Principles in Constitutional Law” to better articulate the thrust of his thesis—that judges ought to 
both (a) clearly articulate the principle(s) justifying their decisions and (b) be prepared to apply those principles 
neutrally, i.e., even when doing so would go against the judges’ own preferred outcome. See, e.g., Henry Paul 
Monaghan, supra note 2, at 1373 (“What Herb insisted upon was not so much that the governing principle should 
be neutral, but that the applicable principle should be neutrally and generally applied.”). 
 243. See White, supra note 111, at 289 (“With the advent of Wechsler’s [neutral principles] thesis[,] Reasoned 
Elaboration reached its maturity.”). 
 244. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1098 (“The law that carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational 
and just as law can be.”). 
 245. Some Observations, supra note 28, at 321 (“[W]hat is generally needed, we believe, is systematic re-
examination of the subject.”). 
 246.  Id. (“We hope to provide a reasoned, integrated body of material.”). 
 247. See Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 22 (asserting that one of legal scholarship’s 
special competences include “relating what is done or is projected in one area of law with what is done or is 
projected in another, in the interest of the justice and coherence of the system as a whole False[and] general 
analysis of concepts and idea, with special reference to clarity and consistency”). 
 248. Robert Weisberg has written that “Wechsler’s creation of the MPC was a high point in an effort to bring 
neutral rationality to the political contentiousness of criminal law.” Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commis-
sions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 229 (2007). Justice Ginsburg described the 
Model Penal Code as a “rational, well-organized Code.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of Hebert Wechsler, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2000). 
 249. Kronman, supra note 233, at 1569. 
 250.  Id. at 1567 (“A prudent person . . . has a high tolerance for accommodation and delay and is able to 
accept the final incommensurability between any system of ideas and the world as it is given to us with all its 
raggedness and inconsistency; who values consent but is not demoralized by the process of irrational compromise 
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the Model Penal Code project, wherever strict consistency would conflict with political 
plausibility, with commonsense intuitions, or with deeply embedded institutional features 
of the criminal justice system, there was a ready-made clash between prudence and prin-
ciple. Wechsler intended to produce a model code that would have significant influence 
over real legislative reform efforts, and to that end, he felt that the Code’s provisions 
should stray only so far from deeply held and widely accepted expectations of the criminal 
law.251 Substantive criminal doctrines that could not fit into the larger legal firmament or 
into the institutional context of criminal justice were non-starters for Wechsler.252 So alt-
hough Wechsler, the principled reformer, was eager to sweep away many of the irrational 
vestiges of common law-derived criminal law, Wechsler, the prudentialist, was sensitive 
to the complex interaction of extant norms and institutions, as well as to popular expecta-
tions. He thus wanted to craft reforms that could fit in and gain legitimacy while amelio-
rating the status quo. 
Both the commitment to principled reform and to prudential reform were authen-
tic expressions of Legal Process jurisprudence and of Wechsler’s own legal outlook, but 
they clearly pulled in differing directions with respect to many of the most controversial 
issues in criminal law. In the context of drafting the Model Penal Code, such issues were 
numerous.253 In some cases, Wechsler and the Code leaned toward principle and in others 
toward prudence; in every case, the tension was reflected in the debates and commentaries 
accompanying the Code. A brief review of the Code’s treatment of strict liability, the death 
penalty, and incest provide representative examples of three different attempts to resolve 
the tension. 
 
1. Strict Liability 
 
The most celebrated and perhaps most influential feature of the Model Penal 
Code has been its articulation of the traditional mens rea requirement of criminal law and 
the hierarchy of culpable mental states it delineated: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, 
and negligence.254 Wechsler and the Code drafters insisted that criminal offenses must 
include one of these four modes of culpability for each material element of a crime.255 
Thus, the Code categorically rejected strict liability crimes and required, at minimum, a 
                                                          
that is often needed to achieve it.”). 
 251. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1113. Wechsler’s commitment to democratic legislation was both principled 
and prudential; he believed both that the people ought to set policy through a democratic legislature (principle) 
and that policies lacking popular legitimacy would eventually prove ineffective (prudence). 
 252. Hazard, supra note 182, at 1366 (stating that Wechsler believed that “legislation on any subject must be 
interpolated as smoothly as possible into the larger corpus of standing law”). 
 253. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1108. Provisions which cast Wechsler’s commitments to prudence and to 
principle, respectively, in significant tension included those related to strict liability and negligence as bases of 
culpability, the death penalty, the felony murder doctrine, liability for intoxication, incest, fornication, and abor-
tion. 
 254. Alan Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 54, 64-65 (2000) (noting that the Code’s “translation of the doctrine of mens rea into the four 
culpable mental states of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence . . . is generally viewed as the Code’s 
crowning achievement”); Kadish, supra note 68, at 953 (“It [the Code] was a breakthrough to articulate so lucidly 
and powerfully a conception of culpability requirements comprehending all crime definitions, and it has been 
transforming in its impact on the law and on legal education and scholarship.”). 
 255.  MPC §2.02. 
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negligence standard for each and every criminal offense.256 At the time the Code was 
being drafted, strict liability crimes were already widespread in state and federal law and 
were, in fact, increasing along with the growth in regulations more generally. Many de-
fended strict liability crimes as necessary features of the complex regulatory state emerg-
ing in the post-War years, the very regulatory state that Wechsler and his Legal Process 
colleagues did so much to help construct and theorize.257 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
had apparently legitimated strict liability as a basis of criminal liability in United States v. 
Balint258 and in United States v. Dotterweich.259 Thus, the Code’s determination that there 
is no place for imposing the moral condemnation of criminal conviction absent some find-
ing of culpability was a powerful stand on principle.260 At the same time, the Code pro-
vided for incorporation of strict liability offenses into the framework of a criminal law 
code so long as such offenses were deemed “violations” rather than crimes and no sentence 
of imprisonment or probation was available for them. This construction of a new class of 
strict liability “violations” was a creative (and prudent) way to allow states to maintain 
their strict liability offenses on the books while downgrading their status from crimes to 
mere violations and allowing for only monetary penalties.261 Taken as a whole, the Code’s 
emphatic position against strict liability crimes was an instance of principle winning out 
over concern for existing doctrines and evolving institutional trends, both of which favored 
strict liability crime.262 
 
2. Death Penalty 
 
The Code’s legacy with respect to the death penalty is complex and defies easy 
categorization,263 but for our purposes, it is the placement of brackets around the Code’s 
death penalty provision that is most relevant. The brackets indicated that the Institute took 
                                                          
 256. Id. §2.05. The commentary begins, “This section makes a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in 
the penal law, whenever the offense carries the possibility of criminal conviction, for which a sentence of proba-
tion or imprisonment may be imposed.” MPC §2.05, cmt. at 140 (AM. LAW. INST., Tent. Draft No. 4 1955) 
[hereinafter MPC Tentative Draft No. 4]. In both its bold assertion of principle (“a frontal attack”) and its careful 
articulation of the limited scope of that principle, this sentence is emblematic of the Code’s commitment to prin-
ciple and prudence. 
 257. Id. §2.05, 141-45 (1955). 
 258. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
 259. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). For a more detailed look at the contours of Supreme Court doctrine on the require-
ments of mens rea around the time of the Code’s drafting, see Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme 
Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107 (1962). Packer pithily summed up the Court’s position this way: “To paraphrase: 
Mens Rea is an important requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.” Id. at 107. 
 260. See id. at 117. And note that this was a principled stand on retributivist grounds, not one based on deter-
rence theory or rehabilitation. 
 261. Jerome Hall, a prominent criminal law theorist who briefly served on the Model Penal Code project, 
argued that the Code’s recognition of criminal liability for negligent action also violated the principle that one 
should not be criminally punished for inadvertent conduct. See Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Ex-
cluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963). 
 262. I am following Herbert Packer in pointing to the Code’s rejection of strict liability as an example of 
Code’s commitment to principle, while noting that the Code’s accommodation of non-criminal strict liability 
violations was a pragmatic means to allow states to retain strict liability offenses. Herbert Packer, The Model 
Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594-96 (1963). 
 263. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of 
the Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1400-06 (2005); Russel Dean Covey, Exorcising Wechsler’s 
Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS COST. 
L.Q. 206 (2004); Walker, supra note 78. 
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no position on the desirability of the death penalty.264 This was one instance in which the 
Code formally refused to take a position on a legal-policy dispute, despite Wechsler’s pro-
nounced desire to provide lawmakers with resolutions—in addition to intelligent consid-
eration—of the various dilemmas of criminal law. But the Code’s lack of an official posi-
tion on the merits of capital punishment was hardly the same as silence on the topic. 
Despite rendering the provision optional, Wechsler and his fellow drafters drew up a de-
tailed legal framework for capital punishment that was so persuasive it would come to be 
adopted and constitutionalized in large measure by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Geor-
gia.265 Moreover, the Code’s commentary made it explicit that Wechsler, the other draft-
ers, and the Advisory Committee all favored abolition of capital punishment entirely.266 
Nevertheless, in a move that Wechsler apparently supported, the American Law Institute 
decided not to take a position on capital punishment one way or the other because the issue 
was deemed “political” and thus beyond its capacity to influence.267 Wechsler’s own 
thoughts on capital punishment were nuanced and perhaps evolved over time. He was gen-
erally opposed to capital punishment—“an abolitionist at heart”268—because he thought 
it failed as a deterrent and corrupted the judicial process, turning trials into “morbid and 
sensational” affairs, leading to unearned sympathy for the defendant, and generally legiti-
mating homicidal violence.269 On the other hand, Wechsler was sensitive to the popular 
support for the death penalty and for the potential negative effects of an attempt at outright 
abolition—including rejection of, or backlash against, other worthy criminal reforms and 
potential popular resort to private violence in cases formerly subject to capital punishment. 
Because any proposal relating to the death penalty would receive wildly disproportionate 
coverage from the press and popular interest, Wechsler also feared that a controversial 
stand on the death penalty might well eclipse all of the other urgent reforms recommended 
by the Model Code.270 In short, Wechsler had prudential reservations against his own abo-
litionist position.271 In the end, he was not willing to jeopardize the Model Penal Code 
project for, what he calculated was, a futile mission to abolish the death penalty.272 Nor 
                                                          
 264. See MPC § 210.6. 
 265. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The details of the Model Penal Code scheme are not germane to this article, but 
have been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 263, at 207. 
 266. See Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1415, 1425-26 (2004) (noting 
that the Code drafters “were repelled by what they saw as the vulgarity of the death penalty and its potential 
to cause social disruption”). 
 267. Minutes of the One Hundredth and Sixth Meeting of the Advisory Council, American Law Institute, 
March 11–14, 1959, at 13. Of course, as Wechsler well understood, every dilemma in criminal law was political 
in the same sense—they touched on deep clashes of values. So there is no sense in which the refusal of the 
American Law Institute to take a position on capital punishment was itself a principled stand against “political” 
decisions. It must be seen as an anomaly in the Code and as a failure to follow through on Wechsler’s goal to 
provide resolutions to all the difficult problems of drafting a penal code. 
 268. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Highs and Lows of Wild Justice, 50 TULSA L. REV. 503, 515 (2015). 
 269.  Walker, supra note 78, at 1051. 
 270.  Id. at 1043 (noting, in the context of New York state criminal law reform, that “[t]o avoid jeopardizing 
important reforms of the entire code, . . . Wechsler advocated catering to popular opinion on the question of 
the death penalty.”) 
 271. For a more sustained discussion of Wechsler’s views on capital punishment and on the significance of 
popular opinion for criminal law reform more generally, see generally id. 
 272. Consider also Anders Walker’s suggestion that Wechsler may have concluded that, “satisfying the retrib-
utive desires of average people was itself an important goal of the criminal process.” Id. at 1028. 
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was he willing to fortify the institution of capital punishment by endorsing it.273 Instead, 
he and the Institute took the passive step of refusing to take a position on the merits of 




If the rejection of strict liability represented the triumph of principle over pru-
dence, and the bracketed death penalty provision represented a stalemate between princi-
ple and prudence, the Code’s inclusion of incest as a crime represented a clear victory for 
prudence over principle.275 Wechsler’s discussion of adult, consensual incest in the Model 
Penal Code Commentary indicated that he found no persuasive reason for its criminaliza-
tion.276 He noted the crime’s provenance in religious prohibitions against inter-family sex-
ual relations, but also pointed out that these prohibitions took various forms in different 
religions.277 In any event, Wechsler certainly never argued that religious views on their 
own ought to determine questions of secular criminal law.278 Turning to more utilitarian 
arguments against incest, Wechsler rejected the view that criminal prohibitions were nec-
essary or justifiable in reference to higher incidence of genetic defects in the offspring of 
incestuous relations.279 The latest genetic science, he argued, suggested that incest did not 
increase the chance of genetic defects, and in any event, non-incestuous (exogamous) re-
lations also had the negative effect of spreading genetic defects more widely in the general 
population.280 In fact, Wechsler pointed out that “inbreeding” had often been used to good 
effect in animal husbandry.281 Nevertheless, despite the absence of secular reasons for 
criminalizing adult, consensual incest, Wechsler argued that such criminal prohibitions 
should be included in the Code because of the depth and unanimity of popular feeling 
against incest.282 Wechsler’s prudential concern with popular support was made explicit 
when he wrote in defense of this position, “penal law will neither be accepted nor re-
spected, if it does not seek to repress that which is universally regarded by the community 
as misbehavior.”283 This rationale points not to any principle of criminalization—whether 
                                                          
 273. There is thus considerable irony in the fact that this optional death penalty provision, lacking any convic-
tion on the part of its drafters, ended up being hugely influential and set the framework for all capital punishment 
statutes upheld by the Supreme Court after Furman. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 137, at 325. 
 274. The American Law Institute’s decision here calls to mind Bickel’s promotion of the “passive virtues” or 
judicial avoidance of value-laden disputes on jurisdictional grounds. Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 
Term Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 45 (1961). The difference, of course, is that the 
American Law Institute was not a court and chose to take on for itself the task of proposing a model penal code. 
 275. MPC § 230.2. The Code’s treatment of incest is also revealing about Wechsler’s view of social science’s 
role in legal reform. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 276. MPC Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 256, § 207.3 cmt. at 231. 
 277. Id. 
 278.  See, e.g., MPC § 207.11 cmt. 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959) (“Criminal law. . . cannot undertake or pretend 
to draw the line where religion or morals would draw it.”). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 232. 
 281. Id. 
 282. MPC § 207.3, supra note 256, at cmt. 233. It should be noted that the Code classified incest as the lowest 
(third) degree of felony. Id. 
 283. Id. 
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of utility, harm, or retribution—nor to any genuinely live debate about the merits of crim-
inalizing incest, but simply to the brute fact-of-the-matter regarding consensus norms and 
expectations regarding the criminal law.284 Wechsler was uninterested in advocating for 
unachievable provisions of law.285 
There was also something about the unanimity of popular support for incest pro-
hibitions that gave Wechsler pause about his own more secular and rational approach to 
the subject. It was not simply that such unanimity made abolition of incest crimes politi-
cally implausible; it was that the unanimity itself suggested (without proving) that there 
was some inarticulable merit in the popular position, perhaps some tacit wisdom present 
in the populace but unfathomable from a scientific or rational perspective.286 Wechsler 
liked to quote Holmes’ dictum that the law “has the final title to respect that it exists, that 
it is not a Hegelian dream, but part of the lives of men.”287 He may also have had in mind 
Holmes’ observation that the “law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts 
of man.”288 In the end, Wechsler’s inclusion of a criminal prohibition on adult, consensual 
incest reflected both his unwillingness to take on impossible causes and his respect for 
consensus views even when he could not find a rational basis for them. 
Where communal norms were as deeply and as widely held as those against in-
cest, Wechsler believed, not even systematic reformers drafting a model code ought to 
recommend changing them.289 But where communal norms were neither so deep nor so 
wide, the opportunity for principled reform should be seized: hence, the Model Penal 
Code’s exclusion of the crimes of fornication and adultery. And, even more daringly for 
                                                          
 284. Even looking back decades later, Wechsler spoke of the incest provision in terms suggesting his princi-
pled opposition: 
The criminal law in our culture has always taken a dim view of sexual intimacy within 
particular degrees of consanguinity—essentially the incest problem. Well, why? I mean 
why should that type of conduct, if it isn’t otherwise criminal, if it isn’t forcible or doesn’t 
involve corruption of youth, minors and so on, why should that type of bodily activity be 
criminalized? 
Oral History, supra note 5, at 870. Still, he noted that despite the lack of secular, rational reasons for the incest 
prohibitions, “our culture” is more comfortable with its criminalization. Id. 
 285. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897) (“I once heard 
the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population would rise if you added two cents to the price of a glass 
of beer. A statute in such a case would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but because it could not be 
enforced.”). 
 286. See MICHAEL POLYANI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4-5 (1966). Charles Barzun has uncovered correspond-
ence between Michael Polanyi and Lon Fuller during the late 1950s. See Barzun, supra note 10, at 51.Though 
such correspondence does not prove a direct link between Polanyi and Wechsler, there was a fairly robust line of 
communication between Fuller, Hart, and Wechsler during this period. There was apparently an invitation to 
Michael Polanyi to give a talk at the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group that Hart, Fuller, and Wechsler all 
attended, although no proof that Polanyi actually did so. Id. 
 287. Holmes, supra note 285, at 473, quoted in Criminal Law and Legal Scholarship, supra note 29, at 20. 
The tension I am describing here between Wechsler’s simultaneous commitment to principle and prudence is 
akin to Holmes’ own dichotomy of logic and experience: On the one hand, “The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience,” O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881), but on the other hand, “it is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” Holmes, 
supra note 285, at 469. 
 288. Holmes, supra note 285, at 477. 
 289.  See, e.g., MPC, § 207.11 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) (“To use the criminal law against a sub-
stantial body of decent opinion. . . is contrary to our basic traditions. Accordingly, . . . criminal punishment must 
be reserved for behavior that falls below standards generally agreed to be substantially the entire community.”). 
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its era, the Model Penal Code took a strong position against the criminalization of consen-
sual adult homosexual relations.290 So the inclusion of the incest provision, without any 
firm principled rationale, should not mislead us into thinking that Wechsler’s devotion to 
principle and reason were set aside at the first sign of popular opposition to reform. Even 
if some critics would have made more radical doctrinal choices, the Code was no mere 
restatement of the criminal law or a simple collation of majority expectations; it was thor-
oughly reformist in its general part, in its overall systematic structure, in its sentencing 
provisions, and in many of the particular provisions defining specific crimes. 
Thus, we can see that Wechsler’s commitment to both principled and prudential 
reform revealed itself across a number of different legal-policy questions in the drafting 
of the Code, and the ultimate resolution of that tension differed from issue to issue. In 
some cases, principle came to the fore, while in others prudence won out; in the death 
penalty case, one is tempted to say that they fought to a draw. In his review of the 1962 
Official Draft of the Code, Herbert Packer famously remarked that “the dominant tone of 
the Code is one of principled pragmatism”291—a slightly paradoxical phrase that captures 
well the tension I have been describing. Packer meant it as a term of great commendation, 
as he too was sympathetic to the delicate balance criminal justice reformers need to strike 
between “fidelity to principle” and a “spirit . . . of accommodation” to the existing institu-
tional framework and popular expectations of criminal justice.292 Indeed, one might well 
describe the central tension—and the central achievement—of the Model Penal Code as 
its careful advancement of ideals on the very messy slate of mid-twentieth-century Amer-
ican criminal law.293 
A final aspect of Wechsler’s prudence was his humility regarding the effects of 
criminal law reform on the actual incidence of crime or anti-social behavior. This was a 
theme Wechsler first sounded back in 1937 in his Caveat on Crime Control—the public 
should not expect, nor should officials promise, immediate or dramatic improvements in 
public order on account of changes in substantive or procedural criminal law, for the crim-
inal law itself is a severely limited means of insuring public order.294 For Wechsler, mak-
ing the criminal law and its administration more just and more workable—bringing the 
ends and means of the law in better accord—was a worthy project in its own right.295 But, 
Wechsler continued to insist during the drafting of the Code, legal reform was not a magic 
bullet that could solve the “crime problem” of the public imagination.296 He cautioned 
                                                          
 290.  Id. § 207.5 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) (explaining the decision to reject provisions criminalizing 
consensual adult sodomy and other sexual practices). 
 291. Packer, supra note 262, at 594. 
 292. Id. Packer even echoed the Hart & Sacks materials in noting that the Model Penal Code reflected the 
wisdom that “in law one does not write on a clean slate.” Id.; cf. HART AND SACKS, supra note 14, at 111 (“The 
social scientist, therefore, never writes on a clean slate . . . he is dealing with a science of ‘Where do we go from 
here?”). 
 293. With typical understatement, Wechsler himself said, when asked to account for the success of the Code, 
“we came up with what seemed like fair and workable solutions, rather than a document that would have seemed 
to the average legislator to be way off beat.” Oral History, supra note 5, at 919. Fairness and workability, prin-
cipled decision-making and prudential consideration—these were the hallmarks of Wechsler’s Code. 
 294. See Caveat, supra note 35, 637. 
 295.  MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 6 (identifying the “ordering of means and ends” as the key 
to solving the basic problem of the criminal law). 
 296. See Codification of Criminal Law, supra note 28, at 1432 (1968) (emphasizing that the Code promised 
“no major breakthrough” or “extraordinary remedies to meet the mounting incidence of many common crimes 
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that, when it comes to criminal reform, the “public views the situation generally with am-
bivalent emotions, sometimes demanding results that no system can attain, sometimes ex-
pressing apathy that is a threat to the supremacy of law.”297 By the 1950s, of course, the 
crime wave of the Prohibition Era was already a thing of the past, and criminal justice was 
not the high-profile object of popular and political interest it would become again in the 
late 1960s. Still, Wechsler was careful to insist at the very outset of the project that one of 
the benefits of an intensive reexamination of criminal law would be that it “may further 
education with respect to the intrinsic limitations of the penal law, as distinguished from 
other and less oppressive, more constructive methods of protection and control.”298 In 
other words, far from touting the great social benefits of a rationally reconstructed criminal 
code—as one might expect in an article meant to “fortify professional support” for the 
Model Penal Code project—Wechsler in fact suggested that the better we understand crim-
inal law, the more we will appreciate the limits of what it can accomplish.299 
In an interview conducted toward the end of his teaching career, Wechsler went 
so far as to suggest that the net benefit of the entire criminal justice system might simply 
be in checking and moderating unorganized, private vengeance. Asked by the interviewer 
to reflect on the Nuremberg Tribunals, Wechsler told a few stories of his experiences as 
chief technical adviser to the American judges and then commented as follows: 
 
[T]he principal function of Nuremberg and supplementary trials was not 
to administer punishment, but to influence its withholding, its postpone-
ment, while passions cooled, and to give reason a chance to be operative 
in determining who deserved to be punished. If the Allied powers had 
simply washed their hands of this question, the liberation governments 
on the one hand, and the masses in Germany and Poland on the other, 
coupled with the liberated prisoners—what they would have done is al-
most as unthinkable as what the Nazis did.300 
This is not such an abstruse explanation. If we ask, you know, “when 
does the criminal law do more good than harm, even domestically,” the 
best answer is not going to be terribly different.301  
 
The remark was off the cuff, coming as it did during his reminisces on the Nu-
remberg Tribunal, and it may not represent Wechsler’s most considered judgment. But it 
is nevertheless revealing of the relatively low expectations that American criminal law’s 
                                                          
reported generally in the country”). 
 297. Some Observations, supra note 28, at 322. 
 298. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1133. 
 299. Leon Radzinowicz, Herbert Wechsler’s Role in the Development of American Criminal Law and Penal 
Policy, 69 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (listing among Wechsler’s principles the proposition that “the criminal law 
cannot achieve [its] object in isolation” from other areas of law and policy). Both Wechsler and Hart took a 
decidedly sober view of what even the best system of criminal justice could accomplish with respect to reducing 
breaches of public order. Hart wrote that “the practical fact must be faced that many crimes . . . are undeterrable” 
and described “the frequent seeming futility of the criminal law when it is considered simply as a means of 
preventing undesired behavior.” Hart, supra note 204, at 409. 
 300.  Oral History, supra note 5, at 913. 
 301. Id. at 914. 
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greatest codifier had for the law he did so much to ameliorate. Of course, Wechsler insisted 
on high standards in all aspects of the criminal justice system and devoted much of his 
professional energy to making the criminal law the best it could reasonably be. But he 
consistently downplayed the capability of criminal law to achieve larger social ends and 
cautioned against tasking the criminal law with work that it could not bear.302 
 
E. Criminal Law and Social Science 
 
The approach that Wechsler took to social science in the drafting of the Code was 
largely consistent with his attitude toward social science in the 1930s: openness to insights 
to be gained from relevant social science research coupled with a strong defense of the 
independent sphere of legal judgment against imperialist assaults from outside the profes-
sion.303 But Wechsler’s skepticism of social science and his confidence in the practical 
wisdom of legal professionals were markedly greater in the 1950s than they had been be-
fore the War. In general, the Legal Process authors were less naïve about, and less infatu-
ated with, the social sciences than the Realists had been in the 1920s and early 1930s.304 
Still, in laying out the “challenge of a Model Penal Code” in 1952, Wechsler 
identified “psychological and scientific criticism” of the existing criminal law as a seminal 
challenge to be faced by the drafters.305 Indeed, he wrote, “in no other area of law have 
legal purposes and methods been subjected to a more sustained and fundamental criticism 
emanating from without the legal group—especially the psychological and social sci-
ences—but buttressed also from within.”306 According to Wechsler, among the bill of 
particulars leveled against the criminal law from psychology was that “the law . . . employs 
unsound psychological premises such as ‘freedom of the will’ or the belief that punishment 
deters” and that, even where it turns to psychiatrists for help, “it poses questions that a 
scientist can neither regard as meaningful nor relevant nor answer on his own scientific 
terms.307 Wechsler was clear that in stating such criticisms, he was not endorsing them.308 
Rather, he explained that the Model Penal Code project would “explore the merits of such 
criticism” and that “[w]here the critique is valid, law will gain from recognition of its 
merit.”309 Wechsler, in fact, recruited top psychiatrists to be consultants and advisers on 
the project and consistently praised legal reform as an “ideal setting for collaborative work 
                                                          
 302. Wechsler’s humility was genuine, but he was also aware of the “rhetorical effectiveness of understate-
ment in this world, as against overstatement.” Id. at 919. 
 303. Wechsler’s skepticism toward social scientific proposals for criminal law is also evidence of Wechsler’s 
prudence insofar as it was a refusal to let theoretical knowledge (science) dictate answers to issues better left to 
prudential judgment, which takes in a wider array of concerns. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 304.  See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 111, at 209 (noting the “casual attitude” of Legal Process authors toward 
social science in comparison to the more enthusiastic embrace of social science by Legal Realists); Barzun, supra 
note 10, at 48 (discussing the view of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks regarding the relationship of law and social 
science). 
 305. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1102. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 1103. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. 
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by lawyers and the representatives of other disciplines and occupations concerned with the 
problems of penal law, with crime and its prevention.”310 
This openness to criticism from non-legal social science was not disingenuous—
Wechsler was genuinely interested in the social science of crime and thought it could be 
helpful in the drafting process—but he tipped his hat regarding his true disposition at the 
very end of the Challenge of a Model Penal Code essay. “[I]f, and insofar as, candid study 
leads to the conclusion that social judgment reflected in penal law rest on grounds unlikely 
to be touched by changes in the state of scientific knowledge,” he wrote “there is important 
gain in recognizing this to be the case.”311 In other words, Wechsler was already asserting 
at the very beginning of the Code project that criminal law was unlikely to be greatly 
affected by any findings in—or criticisms emanating from—social sciences outside the 
law.312 Indeed, Wechsler explicitly rejected the view, voiced by Jerome Hall among oth-
ers, that the Model Penal Code project should be delayed until social science findings 
related to criminal law were more firmly established.313 Granting that social science may 
yet produce “significant advance[s] . . . concerning both the causes and control of human 
conduct,” Wechsler argued that work on the Code should not wait for any such break-
throughs.314 To the contrary, he argued, “only by systematic study of the penal law . . . 
can we appraise the relevancy of behavior science in this field.”315 The value of social 
science for legal reform, he asserted, can be gauged only through grappling with “concrete 
legislative problems,”316 it cannot be worked out beforehand.317 Wechsler’s conclusion 
was that legal professionals have to first do the spadework of systematic legal reform to 
see whether or where insights from outside disciplines might be useful; social science 
could not itself set the agenda of such reform.318 
                                                          
 310. Legal Scholarship and Criminal Law, supra note 29, at 21. 
 311. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1133. 
 312. Indeed, one gets the sense that Wechsler hoped the Code project would tamp down a good deal of the 
social scientific criticism of criminal law. At the same time, Wechsler also noted that, “there is every reason to 
believe that proper canvas of the fruits of special medical and psychological knowledge will have important 
impact on the law.” Id. at 1133. How to reconcile these two statements? Wechsler thoroughly rejected the radical 
criticism of criminal law—e.g., the idea that criminals were merely sick or that their actions were entirely socially 
determined. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 375 
(1955) (condemning as “a kind of psychiatric crypto-ethics” those who “disavow the basic premises about the 
penal law” such as condemnation and punishment). But he did believe that social science expertise could be 
illuminating—not necessarily determinative—on particular doctrinal questions such as criminal insanity and on 
methods of post-conviction treatment. 
 313. See Jerome Hall, The Proposal to Prepare a Model Penal Code, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (1951) (arguing for 
a model penal code based on, and to be drafted after, extensive scientific and empirical research). 
 314. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1132. 
 315. Id. at 1132-33. 
 316. Id. at 1133. 
 317. If it turns out that important legal questions really ought to turn on knowledge from psychiatry or sociol-
ogy, Wechsler wrote, then the law should be drafted with an eye toward assimilating such knowledge as soon as 
it becomes available. Id. at 1132. 
 318. Wechsler’s emphasis on the primacy of legal, as opposed to social scientific, articulation of the issues of 
criminal law recalls this discussion by Karl Llewellyn from 1949: 
When I was younger I used to hear smuggish assertions among my sociological friends, 
such as: ‘I take the sociological, not the legal, approach to crime’; and I suspect an inquiring 
reporter could still hear much of the same (perhaps with ‘psychiatric’ often substituted for 
‘sociological’)—though it is surely somewhat obvious that when you take ‘the legal’ out, 
you also take out ‘crime’. 
Karl Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1287 (1949) 
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Wechsler’s attitude toward social science during the Model Penal Code project 
had significant affinity with the developing views of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.319 Hart 
and Sacks argued that social science—including law as a discipline of study—could not 
“content itself simply with the observation and analysis of human behavior . . . because, 
however informative, the results of these are bound to be inconclusive.”320 Instead, be-
cause its subjects are human beings and human institutions with all their histories and 
complex aims and wants, social science “must depend heavily upon ethical and hence dis-
putable considerations.”321 At bottom, “the science of society is essentially a judgmatical, 
or prudential, science. . . . [It] must depend ultimately upon judgment—upon judgment 
informed by experience and by all the objective data that can feasibly be assembled, but 
upon judgment nevertheless.”322 The Hart and Sacks’ position was, first and foremost, a 
rejection of the idea that legal knowledge—knowledge of legal processes—could be de-
rived from merely empirical means, as some of the more scientistic Realists had suggested. 
Recall that Wechsler too had always rejected the more radical social science agenda of 
Herman Oliphant at Columbia, on the grounds that empirical social science could not 
wholly displace other modes of studying the law.323 However, the Hart and Sacks position 
was novel insofar as it suggested that value-free empiricism was also a deficient method-
ology for (non-legal) social sciences. As Charles Barzun put it, Hart and Sacks “argued 
that the other social sciences, were, or ought to be, more like law—that is, more straight-
forwardly evaluative in orientation.”324 
Wechsler, to be sure, did not explicitly follow Hart and Sacks in making broad 
and controversial pronouncements about the methodology of non-legal social sciences. 
However, Wechsler’s resolute defense of legal judgment for legal decisions reflected a 
very similar view that lawyers had a craft sense for the matching of ends and means in 
legal institutions, which non-legal social scientists were lacking. The point was not that 
lawyers should ignore the fruits of social science research—as Wechsler consistently said 
“you try to get all the information you can get”325—it was that determining how infor-
mation coalesced into useful descriptions of human behavior was not itself an empirical 
technique, but rather one that involved judgment (prudence). For legal questions, Wechsler 
held, those with legal expertise were uniquely competent in making such judgments. In 
any event, Wechsler had very little confidence that psychiatrists or sociologists could do 
a better job than lawyers in describing legal phenomena, much less in reforming law.326 
                                                          
(quoted in Hart, supra note 204, at 403 n.5). 
 319. Hart and Sacks were, in turn, significantly influenced by Lon Fuller’s view of social science. The best 
account of the Legal Process view of social science can be found in Barzun, supra note 10, at 33-35. 
 320. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 110. This was, in part, a criticism of certain empiricist tendencies in 
Legal Realist thinking—e.g., the divorce of the “is” and “ought” of law. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 
1236 (listing the “temporary divorce of Is and Ought for purposes of study” among the elements of Legal Real-
ism”). 
 321. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 110. 
 322. Id. at 107, 110. 
 323. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 871-72 (criticizing those empirical Realists who “seemed to think that 
what was needed was more accurate reportage” and praising as “vital and significant” those Realists who focused 
on “better normative determination”). 
 324. Barzun, supra note 10, at 48. 
 325. Oral History, supra note 5, at 870. 
 326. See Leonard, supra note 38, at 812 (“Wechsler always harbored a good deal more skepticism of the 
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This view not only evinced a certain skepticism of empirically oriented social science, it 
also signaled a return to confidence in the elite legal academy in the post-War years. If 
legal academics of the late 1920s were enthralled with the burgeoning fields of social sci-
ence, differing only on how much law had to learn from other disciplines,327 the Legal 
Process authors and Wechsler himself took a much more self-assured posture toward the 
other human sciences. As the saying went, they were happy to have social science “on 
tap,” but not “on top.”328 
The clearest example of Wechsler’s cautious attitude toward social science dur-
ing the Model Penal Code project was his handling of the debate over the legal responsi-
bility provisions of the Code, particularly the provision allowing for acquittal on the 
ground of mental disease. The venerable M’Naghten standard, dating back to 1843, had 
set the legal standard for the insanity defense for over a century and was still in use, some-
times in conjunction with the so-called “irresistible impulse” test, in virtually every Amer-
ican jurisdiction at the time the Model Penal Code was drafted. However, the M’Naghten 
rule faced increasingly fierce criticism from many psychiatrists and others on the grounds 
that it was “based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of in-
sanity.”329 In 1954, in Durham v. United States, the D.C. Circuit rejected the M’Naghten 
and irresistible impulse standards and crafted a different test that it declared in better ac-
cord with “the science of psychiatry.”330 For our purposes, the content of the different 
rules is not of great import.331 The significant factor is that, as the Code drafters were set 
to tackle the problem of criminal responsibility and the insanity defense, the battle lines 
has been drawn between the traditional and still dominant legal standard of M’Naghten 
and the newer Durham test largely promoted by the psychiatric profession. Choosing one 
or navigating between the two was one of the most sensitive tasks Wechsler faced in draft-
ing the Model Penal Code.332 
In addition to Wechsler, who maintained ultimate drafting control, those primar-
ily involved in the drafting of the Model Penal Code’s responsibility provisions were three 
                                                          
scientists’ powers than did many other reformers.”). 
 327. See discussion supra notes 52-59 and accompanying discussion. 
 328. See W. Wesley Pue, Locating Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 187, 189 (2000) (attributing James Willard 
Hurst the “wish to limit the role of social science to service ‘on tap’ for lawyers but never ‘on top’”). Markus 
Dubber has developed the thesis that Wechsler and his fellow Code drafters naively accepted the findings and 
authority of social scientists and endeavored to fix the legal system pursuant to the ends and means dictated by 
social scientists. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 4, at 79-80. I am arguing against that view of Wechsler’s attitude 
toward social science. 
 329. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53 Report at 30 n.80 (1953) (recommending a change 
away from the M’Naghten standard in England). 
 330. Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (internal quotes omitted) (Bazelon, J. writing for the 
majority). 
 331. For a clear description of the different tests, see WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§7.2-7.4 (4th ed. 
2003). 
 332. MPC Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 256, § 4.01, at 156 (“No problem in the drafting of a penal code 
presents larger intrinsic difficulty than that of determining when individuals whose conduct would otherwise be 
criminal ought to be exculpated on the ground that they were suffering from a mental disease or defect when they 
acted as they did.”); accord Herbert Wechsler, Insanity As A Defense: Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 383 
(1965) (noting that the articulation of the insanity defense was “was one of the hardest problems that we [drafters] 
had to face”).  
47
Wolitz: Herbert Wechsler, Legal Process, and the Jurisprudential Roots of
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
WOLITZ_5.5.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016  5:20 PM 
680 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:633 
well-known judges and three eminent psychiatrists.333 It was clear from the beginning that 
the psychiatrists would not endorse the M’Naghten standard, at least not in its traditional 
articulation, and the lawyers on the panel agreed that, at minimum, the M’Naghten lan-
guage was archaic and its test too narrowly conceived. Representing the predominant view 
of their profession, the three psychiatrists, led by Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, endorsed the 
D.C. Circuit’s Durham test. 334 However, Wechsler and the lawyers on the panel were 
unpersuaded. As they began the drafting proceedings, both Wechsler and Dr. Guttmacher, 
an acknowledged “leader in the field of forensic psychiatry,”335 contributed short articles 
to a symposium on the insanity defense published in the University of Chicago Law Re-
view. Guttmacher’s article celebrated the Durham opinion and explained why the psychi-
atric profession was so supportive of it.336 Wechsler, on the other hand, used his short 
piece to set out his primary criticisms of the Durham test and to preview an early version 
of his preferred articulation of the rule.337 
At the same time they were drafting their dueling articles for the symposium, 
Wechsler and Guttmacher were also exchanging an extraordinary series of letters on the 
same topic.338 The letters, respectful in tone throughout, reveal both Wechsler’s attempt 
to understand the issue of irresponsibility from the point of view of a psychiatrist and, 
eventually, his frustration with the psychiatric position as represented by Guttmacher. 
Guttmacher supported the Durham test largely because it allowed psychiatrists to use their 
medical expertise to make a psychiatric determination of the ultimate question of respon-
sibility.339 Wechsler, for his part, resisted the conflation of a psychiatric diagnosis with 
the legal test for responsibility. Noting that they had finally arrived at “the heart of the 
problem,”340 Wechsler wrote that Guttmacher’s proposal would “either convert the issue 
of punishability into a psychiatric matter . . . or else the psychiatric judge must undertake 
to weigh all the non-psychiatric values that bear on whether a particular defendant should 
be punished.”341 Wechsler, of course, rejected both possibilities and insisted that the “final 
judgment” regarding legal responsibility must be with the court “and the final criterion for 
the tribunal is the criterion of justice.”342 
                                                          
 333. The judges were Learned Hand, John J. Parker, and Floyd Thompson. See Wechsler, Insanity As A De-
fense: Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365, 383 (1965). The psychiatrists were Manfred Guttmacher, Winfred Over-
holser, and Lawrence Freedman. On the three psychiatrists, see generally Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in 
a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 623-626 (2005) (describing Guttmacher, Overholser, and 
Freedman as Freudians and providing more detail on their professional backgrounds). 
 334. LAFAVE, supra note 331, at 398. 
 335. Denno, supra note 333, at 625. 
 336. Alan Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 329 (1955) (“For the 
psychiatrist, the chief merit of the new rule is that it permits him to present his testimony in regard to the mental 
condition of the accused in concepts that are familiar to him and that actually exist in mental life.”). Guttmacher 
also noted as “encouraging” the fact that the Model Penal Code project had sought out “the advice of psychiatric 
consultants” and had made “a wide study of the technical medical literature” regarding mental health. Id. at 330. 
 337. Wechsler, supra note 303. 
 338. MPC Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 256, § 4.01 app. C, at 182-92. 
 339. Id. at 188 (praising a test that “will have the tendency to make the psychiatrist, in large measure, the 
arbiter”). 
 340. Id. at 189. 
 341. Id. at 191. 
 342. Id. Wechsler also admonished psychiatrists for seeking a legal standard of irresponsibility cast in psychi-
atric terms while, at the same time, begging off from any responsibility for the ultimate legal disposition of cases. 
The major point of the entire G.A.P. [Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry] report, as I read it, is that the 
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As Wechsler put it in an address to the New York Society for Clinical Psychiatry 
a few years later, the question of responsibility does not turn on “whether a person who 
has performed an otherwise criminal act suffers in some meaningful sense from a mental 
disorder or defect any more than the question of responsibility would turn on whether he 
suffers from a physical disease.”343 Instead of this purely medical determination, Wechsler 
urged in good Legal Process terminology, the standard must “differentiate between cases 
which, in the division of function our society and culture have established, belong exclu-
sively to mental health and those which may be viewed as cases for correction.”344 In 
short, for Wechsler, the psychiatrist had an important role to play in the process of deter-
mining legal responsibility (e.g., offering an expert opinion as to the existence of a mental 
disease and its likely symptoms). However, the ultimate determination of whether legal 
responsibility should lie is one that also involves non-psychiatric values—”“the criterion 
of justice”345—which are outside the expertise of the psychiatrist and more clearly within 
the institutional competence of a court of law. “The legal standard of responsibility,” 
Wechsler wrote,  
 
is not a proposition in psychiatry. It is a moral and juristic concept drawn 
from deep ideas of justice derived from the ancient world. . . . Changes 
in psychiatric knowledge may have bearing on that issue, . . . but psychi-
atric knowledge can not answer such a problem in itself.346 
 
Wechsler’s approach to the responsibility provisions of the Model Penal Code 
was a microcosm of his attitude toward non-legal social science: In their areas of expertise, 
the social sciences have an important role to play in helping legal professionals make better 
legal and policy decisions, but legal-policy questions are not reducible to scientific or em-
pirical questions, and legal professionals must ultimately rely on their own prudential judg-
ment in navigating the legal process.347 Wechsler’s interest in the insights of social sci-
ences was genuinely high; indeed, he began the Model Penal Code project by promising 
that “[t]o the extent—and the extent is large—that legislative choice ought to be guided or 
can be assisted by knowledge or insight gained in the medical, psychological and social 
sciences, that knowledge will be marshalled for the purpose by those competent to set it 
forth.”348 However, like his fellow Legal Process authors, Hart and Sacks, Wechsler’s 
                                                          
psychiatrist wishes to be disengaged from responsibility for the judgment and feels that he is not so disengaged 
even under the present system. How then can we devise a system under which he will take more rather than less 
responsibility? How can he take responsibility for a final judgment and still proceed in merely psychiatric terms? 
 343. Herbert Wechsler, Law, Morals, and Psychiatry, 18 COLUM. L. SCH. NEWS, March 4, 1959, at 3. 
 344. Id. Wechsler’s speech generally praised the working relationship between lawyers and psychiatrists, es-
pecially their joint work on the Model Penal Code. But Wechsler’s frustration at the psychiatric profession re-
vealed itself in one small portion of his speech where he launched a brief but scathing attack on the failures of 
the psychiatric profession—but only, he assured his listeners, to show how little value there is in criticizing 
something without offering proposals for improvement. Id. at 3. His explicit point was that psychiatrists who 
criticize the law have a responsibility to make ameliorative proposals. Id. His implicit point, on my interpretation, 
was to show how easy it would be to denigrate the psychiatric critic’s own profession. 
 345. MPC Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 256, § 4.01 app. C, at 191. 
 346. Thoughtful Code, supra note 24, at 530. 
 347. The Model Penal Code provision on responsibility ultimately reflected Wechsler’s favored approach, not 
that of the psychiatrists. MPC Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 256, § 4.01. 
 348.  Challenge, supra note 22, at 1130. 
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interest in non-legal social science was driven by a larger goal of helping officials make 
good legal decisions within their discretion, and he thoroughly resisted any imperialist 
attempt to reduce legal questions to those of another field.349 The study of law, for the 
Legal Process authors, was a prudential discipline, not a derivative one. 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
In my account of Herbert Wechsler’s engagement with the criminal law up 
through the early 1960s, I have argued that Wechsler’s Model Penal Code work reflected 
many of the signature themes of Legal Process jurisprudence. In this concluding section, 
I will lay out briefly a few implications suggested by this account for both our understand-
ing of Legal Process theory and for our consideration of the Model Penal Code.350 
There is already a considerable literature discussing the relationship between 
“classic” Legal Realism of the pre-War years and Legal Process theory of the post-War 
years. Clearly, there are both continuities and discontinuities between these two bodies of 
thought,351 and given the diversity of viewpoints within each approach to law, there is no 
sense in which the study of one theorist’s work can decisively answer all our questions 
regarding the relationship of the two approaches. However, Wechsler’s work on criminal 
law certainly militates toward a view that emphasizes the similarities and links between 
the two movements, rather than any gaps between them. As Wechsler experienced it, the 
shift in emphasis that we call Legal Process theory was not a “response to Realism”; it was 
simply one post-War elaboration of the broad Realist outlook Wechsler identified with in 
the 1930s. 352 Wechsler always maintained that his own guiding principles never changed, 
even if the focus of his interest shifted over the course of his long and varied career. Those 
principles were consensus articulations of 1930s Realism both in its critical aspects—re-
jection of “the concept of the common law as a closed system” and disdain for the pre-
New Deal Supreme Court—and in its constructive aspects: promotion of statutory and 
regulatory reforms and a dedication to understanding law beyond “ordering of rules and 
doctrines.”353 Wechsler’s principles were, of course, just as compatible with the 1950s era 
Legal Process theory he did so much to define as they were with 1930s era Legal Real-
ism.354 
                                                          
 349. My use of the term “imperialism” here in the context of disciplinary boundary-crossing is indebted to 
J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 963 (1996). 
 350. One may, of course, accept my historical account without finding persuasive the claims made in this 
section. 
 351. Samuel Moyn, Truth and Triviality: Christianity, Natural Law, and Human Rights, The Immanent Frame, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2015/07/28/truth-and-triviality-christianity-natural-law-and-human-rights/ (“For every 
phenomenon there is an indefinite, if not infinite, number of both continuities and discontinuities with what came 
before. To assert continuity, therefore, could not possibly exclude discontinuity altogether—or vice versa. It is 
only to assert what truth deserves our attention in the mix of overwhelmingly trivial relationships. The only 
arguments that matter, therefore, are why continuities or discontinuities are important, or interesting, or both.”). 
 352. A more narrowly circumscribed version of Realism—e.g., the social science empiricism of Herman Oli-
phant or the philosophically more ambitious Realism of Felix Cohen—would certainly appear more at odds with 
Legal Process theory. 
 353.  Oral History, supra note 5, at 864. 
 354. It is notable that Karl Llewellyn, the quintessential Legal Realist, might just as well be defined as a Legal 
Process author. Ackerman included Llewellyn among his list of Legal Process authors in the article in which 
Ackerman coined the term Legal Process School. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 128 n.26. Note, too, that even in 
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Of course, Realism and Process theory both contained various streams within 
themselves, and one could easily choose definitions for both approaches that set them at 
greater odds with one another. Conventional accounts of American jurisprudential history 
tend to focus on the picture of adjudication painted by each theory, and when it comes to 
theories of adjudication, the discontinuities between Realism and Process theory are more 
pronounced.355 However, the Legal Process view of adjudication constituted only one star 
in the Legal Process constellation of ideas. Legal Process authors took a much more ho-
listic view of the legal system and understood litigation as only one and not necessarily 
the most important aspect of the legal process writ large. Legal Process authors, who had 
experienced the explosion of legislation and regulation that was the New Deal, turned their 
attention to the inter-related decisionmaking processes and structures of legislative, regu-
latory, and administrative bodies, in addition to those of the courts. Their interest in the 
allocation of discretion across the legal system was a direct result of this turn from an 
exclusive attentiveness to the courts to a more system-wide vision. Working in a field of 
law that necessarily implicated a variety of public institutions, Wechsler perhaps intuited 
this change in purview earlier than legal academics working in civil fields. And thus, Legal 
Process themes that resonated beyond adjudication—e.g., an interest in the allocation of 
decision-making power, value pluralism, and the relationship between law and social sci-
ence—came to the fore in Wechsler’s work on criminal law even in the pre-War years. 
Pre-War Wechsler was, we might say, Legal Process avant la lettre. Wechsler himself 
never focused on jurisprudential labels, and surely there is much artificiality in our attempt 
to compartmentalize thinkers into clear jurisprudential schools. But, insofar as Legal Re-
alism and Legal Process theory denote identifiable approaches to law (and I think they do), 
Wechsler’s work on criminal law fits easily within both approaches and thus suggests sig-
nificant continuities between the two. 
If Wechsler was slightly ahead of his cohort in his exploration of certain Legal 
Process themes, the trajectory of his work on criminal law after the War was emblematic 
of the greatly enlarged confidence of the post-War legal-academic elite. The New Deal 
and the unprecedented national mobilization for World War II gave American legal aca-
demics significant experience in major legislative reform efforts as well as an up-close 
view of the administrative capacity of government agencies. The outcome of these efforts 
included overwhelming victory in war and major economic expansion—in short, suc-
cess.356 Many legal academics who once wrote as critics of the pre-New Deal Court or of 
                                                          
The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn described procedure as “conditioning the existence of any substantive law at all. 
Everything that you know of procedure you must carry into every substantive course.” LLEWELLYN, supra note 
69, at 17-18; accord HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 6 (“Knowledge of the procedures by which types of 
decisions are made . . . is root knowledge, with a ramifying and pervasive bearing on legal problems of every 
kind.”). 
 355. Where Realists tended to expose the indeterminacy of legal rules and reveal the nakedly political nature 
of judicial decisions, Legal Process authors attempted to discern the factors constraining discretion and promoted 
“reasoned elaboration” of decisional rationales. Nevertheless, even in the context of adjudication, the differences 
can be overblown. Realists and Process authors both held that judges in fact have significant discretion in decid-
ing a wide range of cases, and authors in both traditions urged judges to articulate as best they could the real 
reasons animating their decisions. The Legal Process authors’ reference to reason or “neutral principles” as cri-
teria of legal decisionmaking has misled some critics into arguing that Legal Process authors believed in a strict 
separation between law and politics (they did not) or that Process theory represented some kind of return to 
Langdellian formalism (it did not). HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 143-58. 
 356. Lynch, supra note 207, at 225 (noting that the “apparent success of Roosevelt’s reformers, so many of 
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archaic common law doctrines had gone to Washington to serve as legal officials with 
significant public responsibility. Most of these academics, including Wechsler, returned 
to the law schools with significant policy successes under their belt and, crucially, a new 
sympathy for the plight of the responsible legal official. Rather than approach the law as 
outside critics, these academics came to see the law from the perspective of the inside 
official doing his or her best to make decisions within a complex system of inter-related 
decisionmaking. The experience of New Deal or wartime service, I am suggesting, yielded 
a grown-up Legal Realism cautiously optimistic about the potential of systematic legal 
reform and highly attuned to both the actual discretion of legal officials and the web of 
institutional constraints within which they operate. This mature variant of Legal Realism 
became Legal Process; and the Model Penal Code was one of its great products. 
What is striking, therefore, about post-War Legal Process theory was not its am-
bitions for legal reform, but rather how modest its reform ambitions were.357 One might 
expect that victory in war and overcoming the Great Depression might have given rise to 
a hubristic sense of the great possibilities of systematic legal-policy innovation.358 In the 
event, Wechsler and most of the Legal Process cohort focused just as much on the con-
straints of institutional actors in the legal process as on their powers. They emphasized the 
legal virtue of prudence—humble practical wisdom in the face of difficult decisions im-
plicating a plurality of values and interests. Wechsler’s rationalist ambition to systematize 
the major doctrines of criminal law was always balanced against his sensitivity to the in-
herited expectations of the public and of legal officials regarding crime and punishment, 
as well as the inherent limits of criminal law doctrine and the criminal justice system to 
achieve the ends of criminal justice. Wechsler’s own off-the-cuff suggestion that a well-
functioning criminal justice system’s most worthwhile function is simply to limit the inci-
dence of vigilantism is indicative of the striking—even jarring—humility of ambition in-
herent in a man who dedicated his professional life to massive legal reform.359 The post-
war confidence that marked the Legal Process School was thus not an arrogant or naively 
idealistic faith in the endless ameliorative possibilities of the law, but rather a restrained 
self-assurance regarding the legal profession’s competence to contribute to the ameliora-
tion of social conditions through careful legal reform.360 
                                                          
them lawyers and law professors, inspired a confidence that laws could be changes and improved by earnest 
effort”). 
 357. Of course, Legal Process theory has been criticized by legal liberals and, even more so, by Critical Legal 
Studies authors for its “complacence” and “institutional formalism.” See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The 
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 667-69 (1993). The account I am giving 
here stresses the virtues of prudence and humility in Legal Process thought, but mounting a full-blown defense 
of Legal Process thinking on specific policy issues is not my project. 
 358. Certainly, the Legal Process thinkers have been accused of assuming that legislators and regulators were 
more competent and public-spirited than they actually were. Id. at 666. 
 359. See Oral History, supra note 5, at 913-14. It is meaningful, I think, that that this remark came while 
Wechsler was recounting his experiences in Central Europe after the war. One factor militating against grander 
ambitions among post-War legal elites was their acute sensitivity to the fragility of public order and the desolation 
of war that they saw in Europe and Asia during World War II. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, DESOLATION AND 
ENLIGHTENMENT: POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AFTER TOTAL WAR, TOTALITARIANISM, AND THE HOLOCAUST 
(2003). For Wechsler, as for Hart and Sacks, avoiding a “disintegrating resort to violence” was the first priority 
of the legal system. See HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 4. 
 360. For a mournful account of the clash between the Legal Process attitude of prudential reform and the more 
ambitious and romantic vision of late 1960s student activists, see GEORGE PACKER, BLOOD OF THE LIBERALS 
22-62 (2000). 
52
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss3/7
WOLITZ_5.5.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016  5:20 PM 
2016] JURISPRUDENTIAL ROOTS OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 685 
Relatedly, the account of Wechsler’s work on criminal law I have sketched em-
phasizes the resonance between the Legal Process approach and what we might call the 
prudentialist tradition in public affairs. Prudence, or phronesis, was one of the cardinal 
virtues of Ancient Greek thought, and there is a line of thinking about prudence stretching 
back from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary political scientists and ethicists. William 
Eskridge and Charles Barzun have already unearthed the roots of Legal Process thought 
in the American Pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, which has certain affin-
ities with the prudentialist tradition I mean to indicate.361 Anthony Kronman has explicitly 
defended another Legal Process thinker, Alexander Bickel, as a twentieth century exem-
plar of the “philosophy of prudence.”362 But the Legal Process engagement with the pru-
dentialist tradition was not Bickel’s innovation, though Bickel may have been more self-
conscious about it than others. Indeed, Hart and Sacks were explicit in describing all social 
knowledge, including knowledge of law, as “essentially a judgmatical, or prudential, sci-
ence.”363 The Legal Process approach to law was recognizably prudentialist in a number 
of senses, but primarily in its consciousness of practical wisdom as a virtue of the legal 
profession and its concomitant defense of legal-prudential judgment against more idealis-
tic normative theory and against the imperialistic assaults of more empirical social sci-
ences. Wechsler exhibited these traits in his resistance to turning law into a branch of so-
ciology or psychiatry, his preference for achievable reform over idle idealistic posturing, 
and his vindication of legal judgment in the crafting of public policy.364 Wechsler’s work 
on criminal law reform thus suggests that Legal Process theory more generally might be 
seen as part of the ancient prudentialist tradition. 
Seeing the Model Penal Code as a Legal Process document also has implications 
for students of criminal law hoping to better understand the Code. First, as many others 
have pointed out, the Model Penal Code was conceived as an exercise in public policy—
that is to say, in governance more generally—and is thus usefully grouped with other major 
public policy reforms emanating from the New Deal regulatory state.365 At the same time, 
Wechsler’s Code did not, as some contend, exhibit a doctrinaire utilitarian approach to 
public policy. To the contrary, Wechsler and the Legal Process approach took value plu-
ralism for granted and, indeed, took as one of its goals the sharp articulation of disputes 
about ends. Among the ends of any just criminal law, for Wechsler, were the protection of 
the innocent against state power and the promotion of civil liberties more generally. 
                                                          
 361. Barzun, supra note 10, at 36-41. Eskridge and his co-author Philip Frickey explicitly engaged with the 
prudentialist tradition in William N. Eskridge & Philip J. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). The relationship between American Pragmatism and the prudential tradition 
is not well theorized, but there are significant areas of similarity. 
 362. Kronman, supra note 233. In Kronman’s article, Wechsler figures only as a foil for Bickel, rather than as 
a fellow devotee of prudence. 
 363. HART & SACKS, supra note 14, at 107. 
 364. Notably, Wechsler’s defense of law against encroachments from other social science disciplines came 
before the rise of the Law & Economics movement, and it is not surprising that one hears echoes of Wechsler’s 
defense of the prerogatives of legal discourse in some criticism of Law & Economics in the 1980s and 1990s. 
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1986). 
 365. See Simon, supra note 217, at 262 (arguing that the Model Penal Code “paralleled the central thrust of 
the New Deal to preserve the essentially liberal nature of the American political order while modernizing the 
capacity of government”). 
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Wechsler, like Hart, insisted on the key retributive insight that criminal conviction consti-
tutes a social and moral condemnation of the defendant, and therefore substantive criminal 
laws ought to be crafted to allow for the conviction of only those who are thus blamewor-
thy. Of course, Wechsler also believed that deterrence of future crimes, incapacitation of 
the undeterrable, and, when feasible, rehabilitation for treatable defendants were also 
among the values that any decent criminal law must reflect. Far from thinking that the 
drafting of the Code required merely technical expertise, Wechsler saw the drafting of the 
Code as a prudential task of prioritizing among multiple and often conflicting values. It is 
true that the Code was drafted at a time when retributivism was at a relatively low ebb—
and treatmentism at its high tide—among criminal theorists. However, Wechsler was no 
“whatever works” consequentialist, nor was he a stalking horse for a psychiatrically de-
rived rehabilitative ideal. He explicitly rejected what he saw as the ideological extremes 
in criminal theory. Criminal law, for Wechsler then, was a branch of governance, but gov-
ernance was not itself a technocratic exercise in maximizing any single goal. Hence, the 
Code is shot through with a variety of conflicting values, varying attempts to balance them 
against one another, and in the commentaries, clear articulations of the clash of ideals at 
stake in each provision. Neither the Code nor Wechsler can be pigeonholed as program-
matically committed to any single ideal or methodology. 
Wechsler was also emphatic that the Code’s completion should not halt the fur-
ther development of criminal law doctrine. “It would. . . be unfortunate,” he wrote, “if the 
enterprise should operate to ‘freeze’ existing law or practice into rigid mold without ex-
ploration of the larger underlying questions.”366 Given the reluctance of the legal profes-
sion to amend the Model Penal Code and its dominant place in criminal law scholarship 
and pedagogy,367 Wechsler’s call for continuous development of criminal doctrine may 
strike us today as a little ironic. But, especially in these days when the talk has again turned 
to criminal justice reform, it is good to remember that Wechsler would be among the sup-
porters of rethinking criminal law in light of contemporary problems and “all the 
knowledge that can be obtained” today.368 Wechsler did not set out to create a techno-
cratic, universal Code that solved all the major problems of substantive criminal law once 
and for all. He well understood that his model was meant to help a concrete process of 
legal reform, in a particular time and in a particular place, and that that reasonable people 
may come to different doctrinal resolutions to the genuine dilemmas of criminal law. Pre-
cisely because it is part of governance more generally, Wechsler maintained that “criminal 
law cannot remain static.”369 
In the end, I would slightly amend Herbert Packer’s initial review of the Code 
and call its dominant tone one of “principled prudence.”370 As Packer sympathetically 
understood, the Code started with a commitment to principled and systematic reform of 
                                                          
 366. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 1133. 
 367. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 207, at 219-21 (describing the tremendous influence of the Model Penal Code 
and the implausibility of any major revision of the Code). 
 368. Challenge, supra note 22, at 1133. 
 369. Radzinowicz, supra note 299, at 7 (listing “criminal law cannot remain static” as among the seven prin-
ciples that guided Wechsler’s work on criminal law). 
 370. Packer called it “principled pragmatism,” Packer, supra note 262, at 594, but I would like to think Packer 
would have been comfortable with my revision given the way he described the pragmatism of the Code. 
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the criminal law, but its drafters were also mindful that “the besetting sin of rationality is 
the temptation to press a principle to the outer limits of its logic.”371 According to Packer, 
the Code avoided that sin because 
 
its spirit is one of accommodation, by which I do not mean the spirit of 
the horse-trade or of that politics which is defined as the art of the pos-
sible. Rather, I mean the kind of accommodation to existing institutions 
that results from the perception that in law one does not write on a clean 
slate.372 
 
Whether Wechsler’s great creation—the work of which he was most proud—hit 
the right balance between principle and prudence is a question that will continue to be 
debated.373 But any serious reckoning with the Code cannot help but see the tension be-
tween them as the central drama of the Code, as it was of the Legal Process approach to 
law—and as it is of legal reform in general. 
 
                                                          
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. As Wechsler wrote during the drafting of the Code, “If we have erred in the details, we do submit at least 
that the philosophy is right.” Some Observations, supra note 28, at 394. 
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